Top management team turnover, CEO succession type, and strategic change
Top management team turnover,CEO succession type,and strategic change
John M.Barron a ,Dmitriy V.Chulkov b ,?,Glen R.Waddell c
a Department of Economics,Purdue University,West Lafayette,IN 47907-1310,United States
b School of Business,Indiana University Kokomo,Kokomo,IN 46904-9003,United States
c
Department of Economics,University of Oregon,Eugene,OR 97403-1285,United States and IZA Bonn,Germany
a b s t r a c t
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history:
Received 3April 2009
Accepted 1September 2010
Available online 28September 2010Keywords:
Executive turnover
Top management teams Strategic change
Discontinued operations Power circulation theory
While previous research suggests that CEO turnover correlates with strategic changes in ?rm's operations such as discontinuation of operations,we demonstrate that such ?ndings apply only to speci ?c types of CEO turnover,and only if non-CEO members of the top management team also exit the ?rm.Our analysis examines cases of contender,follower,and outsider succession and reinforces the key role of non-CEO departures in strategic change at a ?rm.The results support an integration of the upper echelons perspective and the power circulation theory view of top management team turnover.
?2010Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.
1.Introduction
Research on top management teams (TMTs)recognizes that senior executives rarely work alone.The upper echelons perspective (Hambrick and Mason,1984)argues that collective characteristics and actions of the TMT may affect organizational outcomes.However,studies of executive turnover in economics and ?nance typically pay exclusive attention to the CEO and ?rm performance measures (e.g.Murphy and Zimmerman,1993;Warner et al.,1988;Pourciau,1993;Huson et al.,2004).Less research in this literature focuses on strategic changes at the ?rm coinciding with CEO turnover.In one example,Weisbach (1995)explores the extent to which CEO turnover correlates with the divestitures of recently acquired divisions and concludes that the probability of exiting a line of business and divesting unsuccessful acquisitions is signi ?cantly higher with the dismissal of the CEO responsible for the acquisition.
In order to complement the research on strategic changes at the time of top management turnover,our analysis exploits a large representative dataset that allows us to better identify the speci ?c types of CEO turnover that correlate with changes at the ?rm,including joint turnover of the CEO and non-CEO members of the TMT.We use the accounting disclosure of discontinued operations –exiting a line of business –as a measure of strategic change in ?rm operations.Such a variable has been used previously in studies of escalation in managerial decisions (Statman and Sepe,1989)and is similar in ?avor to the variable considered by Weisbach (1995).Our analysis helps
reveal a more focused relationship than has been previously documented.
Shen and Cannella (2002)adapt the power circulation theory of control (Ocasio,1994;Ocasio and Kim,1999)to the discussion of TMT turnover.In this view,there are three distinct types of CEO turnover —outsider succession,follower succession that includes insider CEO replacement appointed after a retirement of the outgoing CEO,and contender succession that includes insider successors appointed after the resignation of the outgoing CEO.Shen and Cannella demonstrate that these three types of succession have different effects on the subsequent operational performance of the ?rm.We complement this strand of research by exploring a more precise measure of strategic change in the operations of ?rms affected by the three types of CEO succession.We also integrate the three types of turnover suggested by Shen and Cannella with the upper echelons perspective by examining TMT turnover scenarios at the time of CEO succession.Our analysis leads to three signi ?cant ?ndings.
Our ?rst ?nding is that CEO departure from the ?rm is associated with reporting of discontinued operations only if other top executives also exit the ?rm.Note that limiting the analysis to only cases of CEO turnover was common in earlier empirical studies in the ?nance and economics literature (e.g.Weisbach,1995;Huson et al.,2004).We replicate the basic ?nding of Weisbach that CEO turnover is correlated with changes in the ?rm's operations.In further analysis,we allow estimates to differ in cases of joint turnover by the CEO and other top managers and in cases when the CEO leaves alone.Doing so demonstrates that the basic result re ?ects a large and signi ?cant link between discontinued operations and CEO departures that also involve departures of other TMT members.This ?nding supports the upper echelons perspective and questions the merit of theorizing
Journal of Business Research 64(2011)904–910
?Corresponding author.Tel.:+17654559282.
E-mail addresses:barron@https://www.sodocs.net/doc/ea15895978.html, (J.M.Barron),dchulkov@https://www.sodocs.net/doc/ea15895978.html, (D.V.Chulkov),waddell@https://www.sodocs.net/doc/ea15895978.html, (G.R.
Waddell).
0148-2963/$–see front matter ?2010Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.doi:
10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.09.004
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Business Research
about the events surrounding CEO turnover separately from those that relate to the turnover of other members of the TMT.
Second,we?nd that a signi?cant relationship between CEO turnover and discontinued operations exists in cases of contender succession,but not follower succession.This result supports the application of power circulation theory to the analysis of TMT turnover and suggests that contender succession and a mandate for strategic re-orientation of the?rm coincide.Our third result is that in cases of outsider succession,a higher likelihood of discontinuing operations only occurs if outsider succession coincides with the departure of other TMT executives.In cases when outsider succession does not involve turnover in the TMT,or in cases when the outgoing CEO stayed with the?rm in another capacity,we?nd no signi?cant relationship.Karaevli(2007)summarizes con?icting?ndings of over ?fty studies on outsider succession and recommends better measure-ment of turnover context.We complement the literature on outsider succession by demonstrating the need for integration of outsider succession studies with the upper echelons perspective.In our extensive sample,the apparent signi?cant relationship between outsider succession and change at the?rm is driven by the cases when outsider succession also involves departure of non-CEO top managers from the?rm.
2.Background and hypotheses
Our analysis complements two distinct strands of research.One such strand,arising in?nance and economics,considers changes at the?rm that coincide with CEO turnover.For example,CEO turnover has been linked to stock-price movements(e.g.,Warner et al.,1988) and changes in accounting variables(Murphy and Zimmerman,1993; Pourciau,1993).Less work has focused on the strategic changes at the ?rm accompanying such movements.An exception noted above is the Weisbach(1995)study of the link between CEO changes and divestitures of recently acquired divisions.
The above turnover studies focused solely on the CEO.However,an emerging literature on the patterns of non-CEO top manager turnover documents that non-CEO departures from the?rm are frequent events at the time of CEO departure.Fee and Hadlock(2004)report that the probability of non-CEO turnover increases when the CEO exits the?rm.Hayes et al.(2006)?nd that the probability of non-CEO turnover increases around times of CEO turnover,which may be explained by complementarities among members of the TMT.We extend this research by detailing the patterns of CEO and non-CEO turnover for an extensive dataset of?rms and exploring the speci?c types of turnover that coincide with strategic change at?rms.
In contrast to the studies in economics and?nance,management literature has long held the view that strategic choices and performance are in?uenced not only by the CEO,but also by non-CEO members of the TMT(e.g.,Hambrick and Mason,1984;Carpenter et al.,2004).The“upper echelons perspective”suggests that observed characteristics of the TMT may serve as reasonable proxies for the unobserved differences in cognition and values that are related to strategic outcomes.A number of studies have shown that character-istics of the TMT play an important role for changes in the?rm's strategy.For instance,Wiersema and Bantel(1992)report that?rms are more likely to experience a change in strategy if they exhibit TMTs with shorter organizational tenure and lower average age,while Finkelstein and Hambrick(1990)report that long-tenured TMTs are associated with strategic persistence.Boeker(1997)demonstrates that turnover of individual members of the TMT in an18-year sample of observations from the semiconductor industry is associated with the strategic action of new product entry.Beckman et al.(2007) indicate that in a sample of161technology?rms,entry of new members into the TMT increases the likelihood that a?rm achieves an IPO,while TMT exits reduce the likelihood of achieving an IPO. Carpenter et al.(2004)provide a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical developments in the related literature.More recent empirical studies explored the impact of TMT characteristics such as gender composition(Krishnan and Park,2005),power distribution(Smith et al.,2006),and pay dispersion(Ensley et al., 2007).
In this study,we extend the research on TMT turnover by examining coincident strategic change in the?rm's operations as measured by new disclosures of discontinued operations.Such disclosures indicate strategic re-orientation at the?rm.Adopting this measure of strategic change allows for the creation of a large multi-industry dataset that complements earlier small-sample studies by considering various turnover scenarios.
Studies of turnover in the TMT also explore succession processes and their impact on the relationships among top executives.These studies include research on heirs apparent,de?ned as insiders who may be in line to replace the CEO(Vancil,1987).Such heirs are often identi?ed by the title of president or chief operating of?cer(Cannella and Shen,2001).The?ndings in this area include Bigley and Wiersema(2002)demonstration that the heir apparent status carries consequences for strategic decision-making,including the tendency to undertake corporate strategic refocusing after the heir's promotion to CEO.
The power circulation theory of control(Ocasio,1994;Ocasio and Kim,1999)focuses on power contests at the?rm initiated by non-CEO senior executives as well as by outside directors and suggests that an insider succession may be the outcome of a power contest.In this case, the inside successor is more likely to have a mandate for strategic change.Shen and Cannella(2002)refer to such successors as “contenders”.In contrast,insider successors that follow an ordinary retirement are likely to have the mandate to maintain strategic continuity(Friedman and Olk,1995).The extensive dataset that we employ allows us to identify cases of contender and follower successions.We anticipate contender succession to be associated with strategic re-orientation and follower successions to have no such association.
Hypothesis 1.CEO departure in a contender succession will be positively associated with discontinued operations reported by the ?rm.
Hypothesis2.CEO departure in a follower succession will not be associated with discontinued operations reported by the?rm.
In contrast with insider succession,outsider succession is more likely in periods of poor?rm performance and may indicate the absence of competent talent inside the?rm(Finkelstein and Hambrick,1996).Outsider successors may have the mandate to change the direction of the?rm,but the lack of?rm-speci?c knowledge and the resistance of the remaining TMT members put outsiders at a disadvantage as Shen and Cannella(2002)?nd a strong negative impact of outsider succession on post-succession operational performance.Zhang and Rajagopalan(2010)present evidence that outsider succession has a complex non-linear relationship with?rm performance.In order to further focus on the differences between outsider,contender,and follower succession,we identify turnover scenarios that include the entire TMT.The upper echelons perspective suggests that change in the TMT may be a key indicator of strategic change at the?rm.Empirically,Mueller and Barker(1997)report that ?rms that experience a turnaround are more likely to exhibit turnover in the TMT.Shen and Cannella(2002)conclude that focusing on the CEO alone“cannot fully capture the performance consequences of CEO succession”.Thus,we consider the following hypothesis suggested by the upper echelons perspective:
Hypothesis3.Joint turnover of the CEO and non-CEO members of the TMT will be associated with discontinued operations reported by the ?rm.
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The context of CEO succession in?uences the TMT turnover,as follower successions re?ect a well-planned succession process (Vancil,1987),while contender successions indicate a mandate for change that may provide for TMT restructuring.Those executives not suited to the new strategies leave the?rm(Shen and Cannella,2002). Our?nal set of hypotheses complements the work of Shen and Cannella(2002)by looking at non-CEO turnover at the time of CEO succession.We attempt to integrate the power circulation theory and the upper echelons perspective,and explore the correlation between strategic change at the?rm and the different scenarios of turnover in the TMT and CEO succession.We expect a positive correlation between TMT turnover and discontinued operations in contender successions,and no such correlation in follower successions.
In outsider successions,we expect the re-orientation at the?rm to occur only if the prior CEO and other TMT members leave the?rm. While Shen and Cannella(2002)explore all outsider successions jointly,we are able to separate cases of outsider successions that involve the former CEO staying with the?rm in another capacity from cases that involve no departures in the former TMT.The mandate for change mentioned in the literature on outsider succession is more likely to be observed if the prior CEO leaves the?rm,and less likely if the prior management team stays at the?rm beyond a transitional period.
Hypothesis4.Joint turnover of the CEO and non-CEO members of the TMT at the time of contender succession will be associated with discontinued operations reported by the?rm.
Hypothesis5.Joint turnover of the CEO and non-CEO members of the TMT at the time of follower succession will not be associated with discontinued operations reported by the?rm.
Hypothesis6.Joint turnover of the CEO and non-CEO members of the TMT at the time of outsider succession will be associated with discontinued operations reported by the?rm.
3.Data and sample selection
The analysis starts with the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset of top executives for the period from1992through2006.With 2664publicly traded?rms in the sample,the panel of observations amounts to a total of23,747?rm-year observations.The ExecuComp dataset records detailed characteristics of executive compensation contracts allowing for the separate identi?cation of the cases of CEO and non-CEO turnover.Barron and Waddell(2003)present a general discussion of the ExecuComp data.
3.1.Identifying the CEO
While the ExecuComp dataset typically identi?es each?rm's Chief Executive Of?cer(CEO),this information can be missing.We therefore supplemented the ExecuComp database in two ways.First, we integrated the LexisNexis Corporate Af?liations database of top executives with ExecuComp.Second,we searched historical sources contained in Dow Jones and Reuters'Factiva full-text news dataset in order to con?rm the executive's identity in cases when the data were missing or con?icting.In total,over1600separate inquires were made to verify and supplement the CEO identi?cation from ExecuComp and Corporate Af?liations data sources.
We were careful throughout to establish the identity of the CEO and the exact timing of succession.In cases when con?icting database information indicated a succession process that was not clear-cut,at least two researchers examined the newswire descriptions of the succession and found agreement on the exact timing of succession and CEO identi?cation in each year.This resulted in over300 adjustments to CEO identi?cation.Most of these changes corrected the reported timing of succession.In several cases we needed to correct the CEO designation,as co-CEOs were reported in a transition period.In another case,we excluded from the sample2years of data for Lucent Technologies,as this company was not spun off from ATT and had no separate CEO until1996,although it appears in the ExecuComp database prior to1996as a separate company.In general, we performed multiple checks to assure overall accuracy.For example,our consistency checks revealed that the unique identi?er assigned to executives in ExecuComp can change when an executive's surname changes due to marriage.A full list of adjustments to the ExecuComp data is available from the authors.
3.2.Identifying turnover scenarios
“CEO turnover”is typically de?ned in the literature as departure from the of?cial position of CEO and not necessarily the?rm.However, a departure can often involve the individual taking a new position within the?rm(e.g.,Chairman of the Board of Directors)or maintaining a past position(e.g.,Chairman would again be typical). One distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we separately identify CEO turnover that re?ects an individual who actually leaves the?rm from that which constitutes a change in responsibility within the?rm. In essence,our expectation is that the CEO's retention within the ?rm contains information.We therefore consider how variation in the observed turnover patterns across?rms–a true departure for some CEOs versus a change of duties for others–is connected to disclosures of discontinued operations.
The ExecuComp data provides reasons for CEO departure classi?ed as one of the three types—retired,resigned,or deceased.We supplemented this information through detailed searches of business publications using the Dow Jones and Reuters'Factiva full-text news database.The collected data helped clarify the unknown and missing cases,identify cases of departure due to death or illness,and separate interim CEOs from others.We removed from our analysis turnover activity involving interim CEOs that constituted about two hundred cases of turnover(1%of all?rm-year observations).As individuals leaving the?rm from the CEO position often have a short period of transition that we want to allow for,we made the assumption that outgoing CEOs left the of?ce and the?rm if they are not found in the ?rm's record of top executives in the second year following their last year in the CEO position.That is,we allow for up to1year of transi-tional employment before making the determination that the exec-utive stayed with the?rm.
Our analysis is also distinguished by including turnover patterns of non-CEO members of the TMT.Once the CEO was identi?ed,we used total compensation to determine the top three non-CEO executives.A similar mechanism is employed by Fee and Hadlock(2004)and Hayes et al.(2006).For each of these non-CEO executives,we assume that if he or she is not among the?rm's list of top executives the following year,the executive departed the?rm.A limitation of the dataset is that for executives below the CEO,it could be the case that exclusion from the set of top-four managers in a given year re?ects only a change in ordinal compensation,but not necessarily a departure from the?rm.In order to provide accommodation for this issue,we compare each executive not only to the top-four,but to the entire list of the?rm's executives in the dataset in the subsequent year to determine turnover.This entire list of executives typically includes at least?ve executives for each?rm,but may have as many as eleven top executives.In addition,we performed over1600individual inquiries on the details of turnover for both CEO and non-CEO executives.Our experience indicates that senior executives that drop off the list for a particular?rm are in fact leaving senior positions.
The de?nition of the top-four executives as the size of the TMT in our study is dictated by the availability of the data in the ExecuComp database.This approach is common in studies that rely on?nancial statements as a source of data.For instance,Carpenter et al.(2003)
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and Carpenter et al.(2001)constrain the de ?nition of the TMT to the top ?ve highest paid executives including the CEO as listed in the ?nancial statements,while Bertrand and Schoar (2003)use the top ?ve executives reported in the ExecuComp .Other studies reported similar mean TMT size using publicly available sources,including Wiersma and Bantel (1992)with mean TMT size of 4.3or Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993)with 3.39.Surveys of top managers yielded mean TMT sizes reported by Amason (1996)–3.45,Iaquinto and Fredrickson (1997)–4.2,Amason and Mooney (1999)–4.9.An extensive list of TMT sizes is provided in Carpenter et al.(2004).In general,our de ?nition of the TMT size is in line with these existing studies,especially the ones that rely on ?nancial statements.3.3.Identifying discontinued operations
In analyzing the effects of CEO turnover,Murphy and Zimmerman (1993)consider changes in R&D,advertising,capital expenditures,and accounting accruals,while Weisbach (1995)looks at 282reported divestitures of previous acquisitions.Our proxy for a real change in a ?rm's portfolio of operations is the disclosure of discontinued operations,which is de ?ned by FASB Statement No.144as “the results of operations of a component of an entity that either has been disposed of or is classi ?ed as held for sale ”.Note that prior to 2001,the guidance for reporting discontinued operations was provided by the 1973APB Opinion No.30that de ?ned a discontinued operation as a separate line of business or a separate class of customer.The change in the de ?nition of discontinued operations can be viewed as introducing noise into our dependent variable,and our empirical ?ndings are consistent and stronger if the sample is restricted to years before this 2001change in the accounting standard of discontinued operations.
In order to obtain a measure of discontinued operations,we match each ?rm in our ExecuComp sample to Compustat records in which annual data item number 66represents “the total of income (loss)from operations of the discontinued division and the gain (loss)on the disposal of the division ”.Our dependent variable is binary and equals one for each year that the ?rm disclosed a new sequence of discontinued operations,as our analysis focuses on the fact that discontinuations were announced,and not on speci ?c amounts.This approach is consistent with that of Statman and Sepe (1989).While
sharing the spirit of the divestiture measure adopted in Weisbach (1995),we are knowingly trading a somewhat less-precise measure of change in the ?rm's portfolio of operations for the advantage of having a measure that is available for a larger and more-general collection of ?rms,which is necessary to separately examine a variety of turnover scenarios.As the ?nancial implications of discontinued operations are commonly spread over multiple annual reports,we focus on the ?rst disclosure of discontinued operations in each sequence.In summary,the dependent variable in the empirical results reported below is equal to 1if the ?rm discloses a new sequence of discontinued operations in a year,and 0otherwise.
We adopt the ExecuComp dataset as our initial sample of ?rms.We limit our sample to those cases where we have information on compensation for at least four top executives each year and for a minimum of three consecutive years in order to de ?ne turnover.In our empirical speci ?cations,we also control for variation in ?rm characteristics that are likely to correlate with discontinuation of operations.In addition,we include measures of ?rm performance such as the industry-adjusted shareholder rate of return on equity over the prior one and three-year periods as well as industry-adjusted net income to assets ratio,anticipating that poor-performing ?rms may behave differently.Given this list of controls,missing information on one or more of these variables yields a ?nal sample of 2399unique ?rms and 17,313?rm-year observations from 1993to 2005.4.Empirical results
Examination of the raw departure patterns suggests why a formal analysis that exploits larger samples is useful in identifying alternative types of TMT turnover.Table 1identi ?es top-executive departure types for the full sample.We identify insider replacement if the new CEO was among the top executives at the ?rm for at least two years prior to assuming the CEO position.Doing so excludes cases when an outsider is initially brought in below the CEO for a transition period.Following the power circulation theory (Shen and Cannella,2002),we separate the insider succession into cases of contender and follower succession.We de ?ne follower succession as insider succession when the prior CEO changes duty and stays with the ?rm in another
Table 1
Executive turnover by type (1993–2005).
Reported number of cases based on a sample that excludes observations with missing data.This sample matches the full sample used in Model (6)in Table 4except that the 45cases when the CEO
left due to death or illness are excluded.The percentages are with respect to each row.
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capacity,or retires.Contender succession is de ?ned as insider succession when the outgoing CEO leaves the ?rm for reasons other than retirement,death,or illness.
Shen and Cannella (2002)view contender successors as having the mandate for change and follower successors as having the mandate to keep status quo,while all outsider succession is explored jointly.Our data suggest that cases of outsider succession may also be distin-guished by the likely mandate of the incoming CEO.In 340cases out of 649outsider successions,the prior CEO stayed with the ?rm after leaving the position.Similar to follower succession,the mandate for
change is unlikely if the prior CEO stays with the ?rm beyond a transitional period.We expect such a mandate only in cases when the prior CEO left the ?rm for reasons other than regular retirement or illness.
Table 1also reports whether turnover in the TMT occurred at the time of CEO succession.The table lists whether at least one of the non-CEO TMT members left the ?rm at the time of the CEO succession.Note that turnover in non-CEO members of the TMT is relatively more common in cases of contender succession and outsider succession with mandate for change.
4.1.Discontinuations and CEO turnover:a ?xed-effects analysis In order to focus on the link between CEO turnover of various types and new disclosures of discontinued operations,our speci ?cation includes ?rm-level ?xed effects which allows us to abstract from differences across ?rms that could be correlated with both turnover and the likelihood of discontinued operations.For such analysis,there are 8096observations across 857?rms that experienced at least one incident of discontinued operations.For comparison,we also report cross-sectional analysis for the full panel in a later table.
The ?xed-effects logit estimates reported in Table 2examine the relationship between strictly prior (Model 1),concurrent (Model 2),and strictly subsequent (Model 3)CEO turnover and new disclosures of discontinued operations.While we remain careful not to unjusti-?ably make causal statements,the collective impact of the patterns identi ?ed across the three speci ?cations suggests that to the extent discontinued operations and turnover co-vary,the signi ?cance of any patterns is con ?ned to within-year episodes.The results suggest that discontinued operations and CEO turnover vary together and with an apparent short-lived relationship.This positive result complements Weisbach's (1995)?nding that divestitures are more likely with the change in CEO.
Focusing on contemporaneous movement in turnover and disclo-sure of discontinued operations,Tables 3and 4examine further the sources of the underlying link between CEO turnover and discon-tinued operations.Table 3provides a version of Table 1that illustrates the differences in the likelihood of discontinued operations depending on turnover type.The striking feature of Tables 3and 4is that the
Table 2
Likelihood of discontinued operations and CEO turnover.
Reported coef ?cients are based on estimates of ?xed-effects logit speci ?cations.Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.The mean value of the dependent variable is 0.143.
Discontinued
operations in
subsequent year Discontinued operations in concurrent year Discontinued operations in prior year Model (1)
Model (2)Model (3)CEO left position
?0.0070.31???0.01(0.11)(0.10)(0.10)Only non-CEO TMT turnover 0.050.120.05(0.07)(0.07)(0.07)Prior 1-year industry-adj.shareholder rate of return 0.00030.00020.0003(0.0017)(0.0017)(0.0017)Prior 3-year industry-adj.shareholder rate of return ?0.11?0.12?0.11(0.21)(0.21)(0.21)Prior https://www.sodocs.net/doc/ea15895978.html, income divided by total assets
0.070.080.07(0.16)(0.16)(0.16)Prior log of book value of total assets
0.77??0.76??0.77??(0.10)(0.10)(0.10)Prior ratio:R&D to book-value to assets
1.58 1.61 1.58(0.94)(0.94)(0.94)Prior ratio:market to book-value of assets
?0.20???0.19???0.20??(0.07)(0.06)(0.07)Prior log of CEO tenure 0.070.040.07(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)Observations
8096
8096
8096
Not reported are coef ?cients on twelve year-indicator variables.?Signi ?cant at 5%.??Signi ?cant at 1%.
Table 3
Percent of cases of discontinued operations across different types of CEO Turnover.
Reported percentages re ?ects the ?xed-effects sample of ?rms used in Tables 2and 4.The bold type indicates a cell that had a statistically signi ?cant (at the 1%level)higher likelihood
of discontinued operations.
908J.M.Barron et al./Journal of Business Research 64(2011)904–910
greater likelihood of discontinued operations in the raw data for CEO departures is traceable to a speci ?c subset of CEO turnover,namely contender succession when other TMT members also leave the ?rm,or outsider succession when there is a mandate for change as indicated by the departure of the prior CEO and one or more of the prior TMT members from the ?rm.This path is highlighted using bold lettering in Table 3.
Table 4con ?rms the statistical signi ?cance of this pattern.Model (2)is repeated in the ?rst column of Table 4as the baseline speci ?cation.Models (4)and (5)then break down CEO turnover further.In Model (4)we allow estimates to differ in cases of contender and follower succession,and in cases of outsider succession with and without a mandate for change.Doing so demonstrates that the result reported in Model (2),one that is repeated in the literature,re ?ects a large and signi ?cant effect associated with contender succession and with outsider succession when the departing CEO leaves the ?rm.
There is no signi ?cance,and the coef ?cients are close to zero in cases of follower succession and outsider succession associated with regular retirements.Thus,the results from Model (4)support Hypotheses 1and 2.
4.2.Discontinuations and top management teams
Taking into account the departure behavior of non-CEO top executives,Model (5)introduces separate estimated coef ?cients for CEO departures that are accompanied by at least one other TMT member leaving the ?rm and those made alone.The empirical regularity identi ?ed in this speci ?cation strongly suggests a team effect in the correlation between CEO departures and discontinued operations.In fact,in cases when the CEO was the only top manager to leave position there is no statistically signi ?cant relationship within the data.Furthermore,this insigni ?cance is observed for all the
Table 4
Likelihood of discontinued operations and CEO turnover type.
Reported coef ?cients are based on ?xed-effects logit speci ?cations for ?rms with at least one discontinued operation during the period,except model (6)which is a logit speci ?cation for the full panel sample.Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.The dependent variable mean is 0.14for the ?xed-effects sample and 0.07for the full sample.
Discontinued operations Model (2)
Model (4)
Model (5)
Model (6)
CEO left position
0.31??(0.10)
CEO left ?rm,contender successor
0.46?(0.22)
CEO left ?rm,contender successor,no TMT turnover 0.210.27(0.33)(0.30)CEO left ?rm,contender successor,TMT turnover 0.67?0.96??(0.29)
(0.26)
CEO changed duty or retired,follower successor
0.14(0.15)
CEO changed duty or retired,follower successor,no TMT turnover ?0.030.07(0.19)(0.18)CEO changed duty or retired,follower successor,TMT turnover 0.390.49?(0.22)
(0.20)
CEO left ?rm,outsider successor
0.65??(0.20)CEO left ?rm,outsider successor,no TMT turnover ?0.08?0.07(0.46)(0.43)CEO left ?rm,outsider successor,TMT turnover 0.85?? 1.00??(0.22)(0.19)
CEO changed duty or retired,outsider successor
0.24(0.22)
CEO changed duty or retired,outsider successor,no TMT turnover ?0.10?0.06(0.39)(0.37)CEO changed duty or retired,outsider successor,TMT turnover 0.440.63?(0.28)(0.25)CEO left ?rm,illness or death ?0.47?0.42?0.23(0.76)(0.76)(0.73)Only non-CEO TMT turnover
0.120.130.130.17?(0.07)(0.07)(0.07)(0.07)Prior 1-year industry-adjusted shareholder rate of return 0.00020.00020.00020.0004(0.0017)(0.0017)(0.0017)(0.0007)Prior 3-year industry-adjusted shareholder rate of return ?0.12?0.13?0.13?0.28(0.21)(0.21)(0.21)(0.17)Prior industry-adjusted net income divided by total assets 0.080.080.080.06(0.16)(0.16)(0.16)(0.13)Prior log of book value of total assets 0.76??0.75??0.74??0.14??(0.10)(0.10)(0.10)(0.02)Prior Ratio:R&D to book-value of assets 1.61? 1.59? 1.60??1.05(0.94)(0.95)(0.95)(0.79)Prior Ratio:market to book-value of assets ?0.19???0.19???0.19???0.32??(0.06)(0.06)(0.06)(0.04)Prior log of CEO tenure 0.040.050.05?0.01(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)(0.04)Observations
8096
80968096
17,313
Not reported are coef ?cients on twelve year-indicator variables.Because Model (6)is not a ?xed-effects model,it includes industry-indicator variables.??Signi ?cant at 1%.?Signi ?cant at 5%.
909
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possible scenarios of contender,follower,and outsider succession. Overall,only CEO departures from the?rm that are accompanied by other TMT departures are signi?cantly correlated with discontinued operations.This?nding supports Hypothesis3.
Model(5)also helps evaluate Hypotheses4–6.Hypothesis4is supported,as we?nd strong signi?cance for cases of contender succession associated with turnover in the TMT.Contender succession in cases when the CEO is the only member of the TMT to leave the?rm does not show signi?cance.Hypothesis5is supported,as we observe no signi?cance in cases of follower succession either with or without concurrent turnover in the TMT.Hypothesis6is supported,as we observe signi?cance in cases of outsider succession associated with turnover in the TMT,but not in cases of outsider succession by CEO alone.Overall,our results suggest that the turnover behavior of non-CEOs must be included in the analysis of strategic change at the?rm and the upper echelons perspective needs to be integrated with the contender/follower/outsider succession scenarios suggested by the power circulation theory.
In the above results,the sample of?rms is restricted to those reporting a discontinuation at least once over the sample period.This enables any time-invariant?rm-level heterogeneity that remains after netting out the in?uence of control variables to be accounted for in the error and not spill into the coef?cient estimates.In Model(6) we forgo this sample restriction and explore the entire panel of?rms; the results are largely consistent with the?xed-effects analysis.One notable difference is some tendency toward larger point estimates on turnover measures,suggesting that?rms that are more likely to disclose a discontinued operation at any time within the sample period are also more likely to experience turnover.
5.Conclusion
Changes in top management teams are important events for a?rm. This research focuses on the correlation between different types of turnover in the TMT and strategic change at the?rm measured by disclosures of discontinued https://www.sodocs.net/doc/ea15895978.html,ing an extensive dataset,we are able to document that CEO turnover signi?cantly increases the likelihood of new discontinued operations,but that this link is limited in three distinct ways.First,we?nd that discontinued operations are associated with a CEO departure only if at least one other TMT member leaves the?rm with the CEO.This result demonstrates the importance of management teams in determining the?rm's real investment strategy.Focusing solely on CEO turnover does not provide a complete view of strategic change at the?rm.Second,we ?nd a link with discontinued operations in cases of contender succession but not follower succession.This?nding supports the power circulation theory and suggests that contender succession coincides with a mandate for strategic change.Our third result is that outsider succession is associated with new discontinued operations only if the prior CEO and prior members of the TMT leave the?rm at the time of succession.Failing to distinguish cases of outsider succession that involve TMT turnover from cases that do not may provide for the con?icting results on the effects of the outsider succession discussed by Karaevli(2007).
The implications of this study for future theoretical and empirical work on the link between turnover and changes in the?rm's portfolio of operations include the idea that such work should not focus solely on the CEO.Integrating the upper echelons perspective with the power circulation theory view of CEO turnover will provide for a better understanding of the impact of changes in organizational leadership on the?rm.References
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(完整版)装饰公司前台岗位职责
装饰公司前台岗位职责 1、装饰公司前台接待工作职责 前台的形象关于公司的形象，是公司的招牌。所以，前待接待这个职位相当重要！ 工作职责：公司前台接待；电话接转、邮件及传真收发、文档复印，办公文档入、打印等。员工考勤、员工资料管理，日常文书、资料整理。其他、人事、行政工作，以及上级临时指派的其他工作。 1、负责来访客户的接待工作，包括为客户让座、递上茶水，咨询客户来访意图，对客户来访进行登记。（填写《来访客户登记表》） 2、负责为前来咨询装修的客户，安排接待设计师。在给客户介绍设计师时，应对设计师进行推崇。 3、在安排设计师接待工作前，应对设计师手头现有的工作充分掌握，做到合理安排。（设计师工作量、设计水平等） 4、及时对设计师服务的客户进行跟进，督促设计师对咨询客户进行追踪服务，然后填写《意向客户沟通记录表》。 5、对已与我公司签单的客户，进行施工跟进回访，施工期间跟进不得低于三次，了解客户对施工服务的看法，并及时将跟进记录上报给公司经理或副总经理。 6、对已竣工的客户进行电话回访，原则上应该在保修期内，每季度回访一次，并填写《竣工客户售后服务记录表》，及时将客户反映的问题，反馈到工程部，对需要保修的工程，督促工程部进行保修。并将工程部维修情况及时反映到公司经理处。 7、为非装修客户提供服务，及时引荐到各部门。 8、接听电话，以真诚甜美的声音，展现公司良好的形象。 9、打扫卫生，保持公司的整洁现象，收换垃圾袋等其他有关整洁的工作。 10、接待客人后，客人留下的杯子和其他没用的资料及时整理，以便随时能接待新客人。 11、现象展示：A.微笑.B.稳定的心态.C.自信(我相信我能)
装修装饰公司项目经理岗位工作职责
装修装饰公司项目经理岗位工作职责 装修装饰公司项目经理岗位职责（三） 装修装饰公司项目经理岗位职责: 1、遵守公司的各项规章制度。服从领导，服从调配，努力完成上级交给的各项任务。 2、装修装饰公司项目经理要领会、了解设计师的设计意图和预算内容，认真执行施工控制程序，掌握装饰工程各项细节要求，并做好客户和工班的衔接工作，与客户进行有效沟通，切实了解客户要求，做好服务，树立公司形象。 3、按照装修施工合同要求，合理安排人员，组织施工，确保按时、按质完成装饰施工任务，并确保公司利润的达成。 4、确保工班的人工费，并与工班签定班组施工协议书，交工程部备案，协调施工中各工种关系，掌握进度和质量状况。 5、对装饰施工班组实施有效管理，对有关项目(规章制度、工程质量、工期、施工工艺、安全生产、文明施工等)要详细交待，严格按规范要求进行现场管理，认真做好现场材料验收。 6、认真按质量体系要求，做好自检、复检，配合质检部门做好工程的检验和客户验收工作，并要求客户在验收单上签字。 7、及时准确传达工程部指示，并向上级及时报告下属工班的运作情况。 8、负责编制详细的增减工程项目联系单，做好工程款的收取和决算工作。 9、装修装饰公司项目经理在施工过程中不得私自同意客户增减工程，若发生工程量增减，须有工作联系单，没有工作联系单一律不得增加费用。 10、积极参加培训，努力提高自己的业务水平和工作能力。 11、装饰项目经理要关心一线员工的工作和生活，做好新员工的安全教育。 12、施工过程中，要杜绝以任何借口向客户借款和索取财物行为的发生，杜绝私自接单，杜绝各类事故的发生，确保安全运作。 13、每天坚持记好施工日记，认真填写施工质量控制程序，及时完成上级交办的其它工作。 感谢您的阅读！
装饰公司各个岗位职责1
装饰公司各个岗位职责 1、总经理职责 1.1 处理公司内部的日常行政工作的管理。 1.2 统筹安排公司各个部门的工作并下达工作指令单，负责协调部门之间的工作配合。 1.3 负责组织和落实装饰工程项目的工作开展并监控装饰工程项目的总体施工质量。 1.4 负责装饰工程材料采购及相关资金表格的审核，及对材料采购价格的审批。 1.5 负责审核《预结算书》、《装饰工程施工合同》、《装饰设计委托合同》等。 1.6 负责审核图纸，包括方案图、施工图、竣工图及设计变更。 1.7 负责落实各部门经理的工作安排。 2、业务部职责范围 2.1 配合总经理制定合理的部门市场发展战略并组织实施。 2.2 负责公司企业形象的宣传和装饰设计作品的推广。 2.3 负责业务联系及与业主沟通、洽淡、协调并签订合同、合约。 2.4 负责听取业主对工程项目及公司各项服务质量的意见和建议，并将其收集并反馈给总经理。 2.5 负责组织材料采购部协助更新和补充装饰材料种类。 3、设计部职责范围 3.1 设计师根据业主要求进行设计前的现场勘察，并与业主进行设计意图的相互沟通。 3.2 设计师负责依据前期勘察、交流的工作，进行工程项目方案设计，并与业主洽淡设计方案的整体构思。 3.3 设计师负责材料样板的选型定板。 3.4 设计师负责陪同业主选购装修主材。
3.5 设计师负责设计工程项目的全套施工图的设计并安排相关人员电脑绘制图纸。 3.6 设计师负责设计图纸的会审及讲解，并移交给施工项目工程师。 3.7 设计师负责设计方面在施工过程的解释权，对设计变更须有正式书面通知，并记录存档；协助施工项目工程师检查施工过程中的设计质量，贯彻设计意图。 3.8 项目竣工验收后，设计师负责安排相关人员负责竣工图的绘制，并须有业主及部门主管签字确认。 3.9 负责公司所有的电子图纸，设计图纸、专业书籍的统一管理，以及公司电脑软硬件的使用和统一安排。 3.10 负责协助项目推广服务部的相关企业形象的推广宣传工作。 3.11负责编制装饰工程项目概、预算书、投标报价。 3.12负责设计变更、工期延误等的签证工作。 3.13负责及时同公司施工部人员进行装饰工程项目的竣工结算。 4、项目施工部职责范围 4.1 负责项目施工人员的组织、管理及安全措施准备工作，填写施工人员安排表。 4.2 负责编制项目施工进度计划表及项目工程材料采购计划的编制。 4.3 负责组织设计师，各工种施工员对设计图纸会审、技术交底。 4.4 负责材料分析表及实际材料用量统计表的编制。 4.5 负责编制利润预测表、含材料用量、人工费预计、毛利预测等内容。 4.6 负责工程项目中的协调工作，包括施工人员，场地设施，工具借用的审批、发放、材料进场安排，现场施工放线、定位工作。 4.7 负责对装修前装修套房的物品检查，并接收。负责施工人员人工费结算及临时水电费、装修押金的退还。 4.8 负责组织施工人员学习安全操作，施工工地的规章制度，教育违章行为，并对临时设施及搭设脚手架等组织验收，合格后方可使用。 4.9 负责施工质量检查，对不负责或明知故犯的施工人员，项目施工负责人
装饰公司员工管理制度及岗位职责
家（工）装设计师的职责 部门职能： 1、接待到访意向装修客户。 2、完成装修设计任务。 3、负责装修业务谈单，促成装修交易。 4、与业务部、工程部协调互动开展工作。 5、对装修设计方案负责任。 能力要求： 1.组织、实施、协调工作能力。 2.综合解决设计问题能力。 3.克服困难，创造性地完成工作任务能力。 4.恰当处理客户纠纷能力。 5.亲和力。 一、设计主管岗位职责： 1.全面组织本部门工作（计划，实施，督导）。 2.在部门范围内贯彻公司有关规定。 3.落实工作任务到本部门员工。 4.对下属员工的工作绩效机型评估，考核。 5.定期向直属上级汇报本部门工作。 6.协调下属之间的工作。 7.审核设计方案。 8.立足本部门工作，向公司提出合理化建议。 二、设计师 直属上级：设计主管 能力要求： 1.独立谈单及完成整套室内装修设计方案能力。 2.解决一般设计问题能力。 3.克服困难，创造性地完成工作任务能力。 4.客户沟通能力。 5.亲和力。 岗位职责： 1.公司接洽客户来访。 2.现场测量待装修房屋、场地。 3.主持装修方案设计、预算，完成设计任务，做出符合客户要求的 设计方案。 4.代表公司同客户议价，签订装修合同。 5.主持施工现场技术交底。 6.跟踪施工过程，解决施工中相关设计问题。 7.主持施工中的设计变更。 8.融洽客户关系。 9.立足本岗位工作，提出合理化建议。 三、设计部主管工作流程： 固定安排： 1.每月定期，向主管本部门的经理提交本部门上月的月度工作总 结。 2.每周五组织召开本部门例会： 1)传达公司精神； 2)总结一周工作； 3)安排、布置工作任务； 4)调整下属工作状态； 公司日常工作： 1.维持本部门工作秩序。 2.管理设计任务： 1)协助财务收取装修定金，开具收款收据，确认设计任务； 2)安排设计任务到设计师，填写设计任务单。 3)跟踪设计进程，协助、督促设计师在限定时间作出设计方案。 4)审核设计方案和施工图纸、工程预算、装修合同。 3.协助设计师与客户签订装修合同。 4.向财务移交装修合同，登记备案。 5.将已签订的装修合同相关施工部分副本移交工程部、财务部。 合同转接程序：已签合同（所有文本、电子表格预算、效果图）由设计部一并交财务由签收人填写合同明细内容；财务部将合同登记备案。设计部填写工
健身房工作总结怎么写
健身房工作总结怎么写 健身房的兄弟姐妹们，谢谢你们教会了我许多，我会用这些，努力的，自信的走下去。也希望每一个人都生活愉快，前途无量，一切都好！以下内容是小编为您精心整理的，欢迎参考！ 健身房工作总结篇一时光荏苒，岁月如梭，转眼间短短几十天的暑期生活已经结束，首先在此感谢中国XX大学勤工助学服务中心这个平台，给予我们每个人的一个锻炼自我，同时收获到一份工资的机会，感谢中心老师和主任对我们工作的信任，感谢所有部员对工作的大力支持、积极配合，有了大家的团结一致，才迎来了暑期勤工助学工作的欣欣向荣。 在这短短五十天的工作中，我们收获到的不仅仅是那一份工资，更重要的是认识到了很多优秀的哥们姐妹，大家在一起谈天论地，说说笑笑，那是一种幸福....... 五十天的时间，说长不长说短不短，但期间发生了许许多多的事情，我的思想和观念也发生了很大的转变。走了这么久，回头看看自己在健身房走过的每一天，脸上都会洒满笑容。每当看到一张张可爱的笑脸时，我会感到特别的幸福。 健身房见证了我们的努力，我们在一起也互相鼓励过彼此的成长虽然我们来自不同地方，不同学院，可是，我们是
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健身房前台工作总结
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健身房年年度工作总结
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健身房工作总结(共12篇汇总).doc
健身房2016年终工作总结范文 健身房2016年终工作总结范文 一个好的健身教练，可以给客人们带来更好的帮助，这也是为什么会有那么多人选择健身房的原因，因为有一个专业的健身教练在一旁指导，这样会更加有利于帮助自己塑造体形，而且还可以时刻提点自己哪些方面做得不正确，可以便于及时更改。 2016年来，我在健身教练岗位上学习了许多，也有些许心得，现将其总结如下 不断地学习 想成为一个优秀的教练，关键在于如何训练，如何成长提高自己，当教练不是一天就能成的事情，健身行业发展快，不断跟上时代的变化。才能取得成功，不断学习，培训更新新的技术，千万不能永远原地踏步。 多接触好的环境 保持良好心态的秘诀在于，让自己身处良好的环境，人是环境的产物，努力给自己创造良好的环境时间的积累很多大牌教练刚开始的时候还不如你呢，关键是他们从业时间长，跳的时间长了有经验而已。 关键靠自己 任何的天才，取得成功人，都是自己训练出来的。老师只是起到指引作用。 成功秘诀 练一万遍就比练100遍强，身体协调性性，越练越好。协调性不是天生的，是后天训练出来的。复习就能出成绩，锁定目标，专注重复 虚心教练 不能轻浮，不要盲目自大，勇敢接受别人的意见，完善自己。 2017即将到来，我会根据15年的领悟，做好健身教练本职工作，不断向前! >七言绝句大全 >长方形的表面积公式 >"沉舟侧畔千帆过,病树前头万木春"全诗
健身房年终工作总结 有总结才能有所提高，无论是成功还是失败，其经验和教训都值得我们总结，成功的经验可以移植，失败的教训不会让我们重蹈覆辙。今天给大家为您整理了健身房年终总结范文，希望对大家有所帮助。 健身房年终工作总结(一) 时光荏苒，岁月如梭，转眼间短短几十天的暑期生活已经结束，首先在此感谢中国xx大学勤工助学服务中心这个平台，给予我们每个人的一个锻炼自我，同时收获到一份工资的机会，感谢中心老师和主任对我们工作的信任，感谢所有部员对工作的大力支持、积极配合，有了大家的团结一致，才迎来了暑期勤工助学工作的欣欣向荣。 在这短短五十天的工作中，我们收获到的不仅仅是那一份工资，更重要的是认识到了很多优秀的哥们姐妹，大家在一起谈天论地，说说笑笑，那是一种幸福....... 五十天的时间，说长不长说短不短，但期间发生了许许多多的事情，我的思想和观念也发生了很大的转变。走了这么久，回头看看自己在健身房走过的每一天，脸上都会洒满笑容。每当看到一张张可爱的笑脸时，我会感到特别的幸福。 健身房见证了我们的努力，我们在一起也互相鼓励过彼此的成长虽然我们来自不同地方，不同学院，可是，我们是一家人，在这一暑假中，有太多的欢笑和努力。让我们将欢声笑语用文字记录于此，让我们将感动和幸福分享给每一个人，让我们将爱传递....... 五十天的风风雨雨我们都到了今天，转眼间，我们都长大了许多，看到自己的一点点的进步，会很开心，在这个大家庭中，我成长了。可是我始终知道自己还有很多的不足，我希望在接下来的工作和学习，进一步的成长，让自己不断的进步。 健身房的兄弟姐妹们，谢谢你们教会了我许多，我会用这些，努力的，自信的走下去。也希望每一个人都生活愉快，前途无量，一切都好!!! 健身房年终工作总结(二) 20XX年就要过去了，今年是本俱乐部明确发展方向的一年，在过去的一年里，通过大家的不懈努力，俱乐部在各个方面都取得了长足的进步和可喜的成绩，俱乐部迎来了加速发展的良好契机。在这里做个简短的总结 自“龙德”健身俱乐部20XX年成立以来，我们一直以“立足服务建体系，创新思路促发展”为宗旨，将俱乐部作为宣传和组织体育活动的阵地，为促进素质教育的实施、培养青少年体育人才、 今年我们参加了首届亚足联“中国展望——南京项目”的城市联赛，虽然，我们每年都要参加地方足协组织的相关业余联赛。但是，此次“城市联赛”严谨的管理，参赛队伍的质量和比赛的激烈程度都大大的强于以往。接近专业比赛的氛围大大激励了大家，面对强敌敢打敢拼，努力争胜，克服了年龄偏大、人员不整、水平差异较大的诸多不利因素，最终超额完成赛前既定目标，取得了第三名的好成绩。而且，吴与伦比在因伤缺席几轮的情况下，以绝对优势一举夺得联赛的“最佳射手”更加可喜可贺。
装饰公司员工岗位职责
东韵装饰公司员工岗位职责 市场部岗位职责 【部门职能】 1.根据公司目标制定的营销决策、方针、制度、并跟进营销目标计划的达成； 2.责公司品牌品牌推广、对内对外的资源整合； 3.市场信息的的收集与分析； 4.市场渠道维护与开发。 （一）市场部主管 职务陈述： （1）市场调研、情报收集、分析与预测； （2）负责公司品牌推广与市场推广方案策划； （3）主持市场部管理工作；根据公司目标制定的营销决策、方针、制度、并跟进营销目标计划的达成。 岗位职责： 1.负责营销各阶段市场研究与定位； 2.全面参与市场前期策划、推广策划及营销策划方案的制订； 3.负责销售各阶段的营销策划方案的制订与执行； 4.负责市场决策的事后评估与调整； 5.参与产品研发，对产品设计、销售策略提出建议； 6.主持和参与市场调研、情报收集、分析与预测,不断主动提出经营发展的建议和设想,指出发展方向； 7.协助其他部门制定或审查营销、广告、宣传、公关、企业文化、危机处置、诉讼等方面的策划。 8.负责制定项目销售计划和销售任务； 9.负责销售现场的日常管理及团队管理 10.领导本部门协助完成公司下达的业绩指标； 11.积极在本部门推行公司的各项政策和管理制度，并监督实施； 12.协调本部门内部整体工作关系和员工关系； 13.制定本部门工作计划及培训计划，组织安排市场部的整体培训和考核，提高本部门全体员工的素质和业务水平； 14.负责总体协调配合与其他部门的工作，使相关工作顺利进行。 （二）市场专员 职务陈述： （1）负责小区拓展及关系维护；. （2）负责公司理念、产品、服务、设计等优势的宣传和推广 岗位职责： 1.开拓和建立信息渠道，维护并保持各渠道的信息资源的畅通；（小区拓展及关系维护） 2.及时了解客户需求并积极作出合理正确的反应； 3.负责公司理念、产品、服务、设计等优势的宣传和推广； 4.积极主动的完成上级领导交办的其他工作。
健身房年度工作总结
转眼，又到了我们写工作总结的时候，大家知道怎么去写好这个工作总结吗？下面是搜集整理的健身房年度工作总结，欢迎阅读。更多资讯请继续关注年度工作总结栏目！ 盛年不再来，一日难再晨。及时当勉励，岁月不待人。不知不觉日历已经快翻到了20 年。蓦然回首，酸甜苦辣应有尽有。“新生”时期，工作的千丝万缕，学生的繁琐哆嗦对于我来说不再是力不从心。不过还是有几个“调皮大王”有时也会弄得我感到手足无措。多得王亚龙教练以及几个助教的亲临指导啊！ 在他们那我取得了不少经验，使我的业务水平能在短时间内飞速升级。我是任教散打班的教练。本班是由126名成员组成的团体，途中有两名同学辍学了。各种原由或许是我个人、又或许是他们自己身上吧？吾以真心诚意对学生负责的态度，较圆满地完成了本学期的武训教育工作以及学生们的思想工作。一下是我本学期的工作总结报告。不才之处，还请海涵。 一、思想工作 思想有多远，人就能走多远。这是央视一个公益广告的广告词。所以，我认为思想工作是各项工作的根本、能让学生健康成长的保健品。现在部份的学生性格上出现了点小叛逆。他们现正处于成长于人生价值观的行程阶段。每个人对人生价值观的认识各有不同的看法。意志稍有不坚定，思想就容易出现问题。如今，班里出现的“小问题”也少了。因为本学期我所带的学生从对散打一窍不懂的学生变成了各个都长的有板有眼的帅小伙了，所以整天就想着“干大事”慢慢地现实版的《宫心计》就开始独家上映了，同学之间的勾心斗角也随之激发。 这令我倍感压力大增，时而心浮气躁。我只能及时跟进，了解情况，而后上报，找出问题的导火线，争取解决问题避免出现萌芽状态。我时常反思自己的教育和管理手段是否妥当。将自己位置将到朋友甚至是兄弟的平等角度去感染他们、感化他们。想要成功，只有真心付出。得到的或许是一份理解、一个微笑、更是一股向上的动力。对此，我也进行了有针对性的管理，更深入学生的学习与生活中，做到了解、关心、教育并且督促其养成良好的习惯。 发挥教练言传身教的示范效果，发扬武术健身协会树立一帜的优良传统。秉承“以武健身，以武养性”的办学宗旨;灌输“团结、奋进、求实、创新，弘扬中华武术”的办学理念。全面贯彻落实协会的各项工作要求以及管理制度。做到坚决服从，部署到位，落实有策。着力抓好本班的各项工作，加强日常生活管理。 二、武术训练的教学 由于本学期我带的武术队相对来说学员比较杂。学生们对武术的认识较浅，兴趣不够浓烈。对于类似这些患有厌学症的学生，一方面我从学生那边着力了解，另一方面我也自身投入到训练中。从而激发学生们的兴趣与热情。这样的相互促进，不仅提高了武训的气氛与训练效果，也成为了我的教学动力。 三、努力创新、不断改进 在以后的工作中，我会更加认真地去钻研教育管理手段、训练技能与各项理论。关注学
装饰公司岗位职责
伍创装饰公司岗位职责 市场部岗位职责 【部门职能】 1.根据公司目标制定的营销决策、方针、制度、并跟进营销目标计划的达成； 2.负责公司品牌推广、对内对外的资源整合； 3.市场信息的收集与分析； 4.市场渠道维护与开发。 （一）市场部经理 直属下级：业务主管、业务员 职务陈述： 主持营销部部管理工作；根据公司目标制定的营销决策、方针、制度、并跟进营销目标计划的达成。 岗位职责： 1.负责营销各阶段市场研究与定位； 2.全面参与市场前期策划、推广策划及营销策划方案的制订； 3.负责销售各阶段的营销策划方案的制订与执行； 4.负责市场决策的事后评估与调整； 5.参与产品研发，对产品设计、销售策略提出建议； 6.参与项目文案创意。 8.负责制定项目销售计划和销售任务； 9.负责销售现场的日常管理及团队管理 10.领导本部门协助完成公司下达的业绩指标； 11.积极在本部门推行公司的各项政策和管理制度，并监督实施； 12.协调本部门内部整体工作关系和员工关系； 13.制定本部门工作计划及培训计划，组织安排客服部的整体培训和考核，提高本部门全体员工的素质和业务水平； 14.负责总体协调配合与其他部门的工作，使相关工作顺利进行； 15.按时提报相关报表。
市场推广职责： （1）市场调研、情报收集、分析与预测； （2）负责公司品牌推广与业务推广方案策划；、 （3）根据企业内外环境条件和发展战略,提出企业经营思路和策略的方案； （4）主持和参与市场调研、情报收集、分析与预测,提出业务推广发展的建议和设想,指出发展方向；（5）调研诊断,找出业务推广中存在的问题和弊病,提出改进方案,并追踪其效果。 （6）协助其他部门制定或审查广告、宣传、公关、企业文化、危机处置等方面的策划。 （7）协助企划部门完成公司品牌宣导及关活动的策划、组织工作; （三）业务主管、业务员 职务陈述： （1）负责小区拓展及关系维护；. （2）负责公司理念、产品、服务、设计等优势的宣传和推广 岗位职责： 1.开拓和建立信息渠道，维护并保持各渠道的信息资源的畅通；（小区拓展及关系维护） 2.及时了解客户需求并极时作出合理正确的反应； 3.负责公司理念、产品、服务、设计等优势的宣传和推广； 4.积极主动的完成上级领导交办的其他工作。 电话推广： 1.通过电话进行产品推广，完成各项销售指标； 2.通过电话沟通了解客户需求, 寻求销售机会并完成销售业绩； 3.开发新客户，拓展与老客户的业务，维护老客户关系； 4.协调公司内部资源，提高客户满意度。 设计部岗位职责 【部门职能】 1、接待装修客户来访；
健身房销售人员工作总结
健身房销售人员工作总结 作为一名健身专业的大学生，我们不但仅要把专业知识学好， 还要在实践中去持续的锻炼自己，增强自己的实际水平。在前段时间，我们班的人轮流实行了为期两周的社会实践，日子虽短，但也颇有收获。说实话，在做这件工作之前我还真的不了解健身会籍顾问到底是 怎么一回事，这次锻炼是让自己系统的学习了一下，也知道了所谓的 健身房销售一行是真的不简单。 所谓的健身会籍顾问，其实就是健身中心里的是销售人员。在工 作中，顾客就是我们的上帝，一个甜美的微笑能够给顾客带来一天美 好的心情，一句轻声的问候消除了与顾客之间的距离，真正的做到了 来到新领域，大家是一家人，给顾客一种宾至如归的感觉。在这里， 顾客享受到的不但仅是健身的乐趣，同时他们享受到了家的温暖，在 身体得到有效锻炼的同时，心里也得到了甜蜜的滋润，每当看到客户 对我们的服务感到满意的时候，自己心里也感到了前所未有的满足和 骄傲。 为此，自己总结了“五步”工作法，即 “聆听、建议、指导、协助、服务”。 客户来到健身俱乐部，就一定有自己的想法和目的，为此，每次 客户到来的时候，聆听他们的需求是最关键的一步，只有这样才能真 正了解客户想要的是什么，他们想达到一种什么样的健身目的，只有 了解到了这个点，才能针对客户的实际情况，做到有所放矢，并提供 长久优质的服务。 同时，我还觉得健身房会籍顾问还应该做到以下几点 一、会籍顾问要参与健身，不敢说要喜欢，但是既然选择了这份 工作，起码你要熟知，这是基本，懂不懂行，一聊就聊出来了，包括 器械、教练、环境、服务等，千万不要一问三不知，客户问你一个问题，你去找一个人咨询完再来回答，那说句不中听的，你是干嘛用的，