Fiscal Prudence and Growth Sustainability_ An Analysis of China’s Public Debts

Fiscal Prudence and Growth Sustainability:An Analysis of China’s Public Debts

Gang FAN 1,2?and Yan LV 1

1Peking University and 2National Economic Research Institute

This paper analyses and assesses China’s current ?scal system,including its basic institutional arrangements,the relationship between central and local governments,and the ?scal balance and public debt.This paper pays special attention to the local government borrowings that have increased dramatically in recent years,and tries to measure the “overall public debt risk”by includ-ing all kinds of eligible debts.This paper ?nds that although the large expansion of local govern-ment debt during the ?scal stimulation response to the global ?nancial crisis was devastating,the all-inclusive total public debt to gross domestic product ratio remains under 50%,and as long as the local debt stops growing,the risk is quite manageable.This paper also points out that more attention should be paid to improving and reforming the Chinese ?scal system,particularly the reform of the ?scal relationship between central and local governments,and the legal framework for local government debt management.

Key words:?nancial risk,?scal system,local government borrowing,public debt

JEL codes:H61,H63,H74

1.Introduction

Once upon a time as recently as the late 1960s,under the centrally planned economic system and during the Culture Revolution,China,as a state,announced with great pride that it had got rid of all domestic and foreign debts.“We got no debt at all!”

Today,with European and US public debt crises looming around,many people,Chinese and foreign,are worrying about China’s debt problem.This worry has its reasons,particularly because local governments’borrowings increased dramatically in the one year of 2009when the central government adopted a drastic stimulus package to tackle the devastating impacts of the US ?nancial crisis,including a historically loose monetary policy that allowed the local governments to borrow.

However,to understand China’s public debt issues,we need to understand China’s basic ?scal and ?nancial system,and the relationship between the central and the local governments.Therefore,in this paper,we will go through some analyses of the institu-tional arrangements of government ?nancing ?rst,make a brief summary of the history of public debt problems in 1980s and 1990s,and then focus on what has happened in recent times.

?Correspondence:Gang Fan,Peking University,Yiheyuan Road No.5,Beijing,100871,China.Email:fangang@https://www.sodocs.net/doc/808437390.html,

doi:10.1111/j.1748-3131.2012.01234.x Asian Economic Policy Review (2012)7,202–220?2012The Authors

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Gang Fan and Yan Lv China’s Public Debt

2.A Centralized Regime:China’s Fiscal System

China’s current state system features a centralized regime in both political and?scal senses.Politically,all local of?cials(“party secretary generals,”in particular)are supposed to be appointed by the central authority,although the appointment process now is more and more based on references to“opinion polls”among of?cials and other people.Fis-cally speaking,it is not a federal system based on the?scal autonomy of the local states, like the USA,but a centralized regime where the central government’s collection of the majority of tax revenues,part of which is transferred to the local budgets,and the central government’s monopoly of the right to issue debt to the public.

Laws,regulations,and institutional arrangements,which have been put into function in past years,are now playing key roles in China’s current?scal system.

2.1Tax Sharing System(fen shui zhi)

The Tax Sharing System was introduced in1994.It was a reform of the previous“Tax Revenues(Remittance)Contract System”between the central and the local governments, under which a?xed or“contracted”revenues for the central government declined as a proportion of the total from40.5%in1984to22.0%in1993,with the local government revenues continuously increasing with the strong economic growth1(China Economic Information Network Statistic Database).The“Tax Sharing”was actually a recentraliza-tion process,aimed at turning the trend of decline in central revenues around.Under the new system,taxes were reassigned between the central and the local governments in terms of both items and sharing ratios.2Under such a system,both the revenues of the central and local governments are supposed to grow along with the gross domestic product(GDP),but with bigger proportion goes to the central government,so the central government can play a roles of transfers among the localities to reduce regional disparities.From these perspectives,the reform since1994has been a great success.The total?scal revenues grew steadily in both absolute and relative terms,from10.8%of GDP in1994to21.4%of GDP in2010,and the central government’s share increased from barely20%of the total in early1994to nearly60%in2010(China Economic Infor-mation Network Statistic Database).

Local governments took about40%of national government revenues,while they spent more than60%of national government expenditures in recent years,re?ecting ?rst of all the increasing?scal transfers through the central government’s budget.In 2010,?scal transfers were76.1%of the central?scal revenues and43.8%of the local ?scal expenditures(China Economic Information Network Statistic Database).

The Tax Sharing and?scal transfers make it possible for the government to have a consolidated state budget balance sheet that may include all items from both central and local revenues and expenditures in the formal budget.There have been several efforts since1994to include originally“informal budget items,”such as fees,?nes,special funds, and so on into the budget(Fan,1999a).A recent effort to make it as consolidated as pos-sible was to include all revenues from land sales into the local state budgets(Fan et al., 2010;p.102).

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China’s Public Debt Gang Fan and Yan Lv 2.2The State Budget Law(yu suan fa)

One of the key elements of China’s centralized?scal regime is demonstrated by the central government’s monopoly on government debt?nancing.This institution was set up in the State Budget Law effective in1994,which stated that the central government can issue government bonds domestically or externally to?nance its budget de?cits, while local governments are not allowed to issue local government bonds and/or to borrow from commercial banks,except in cases speci?cally listed by laws or permitted (event handled)by the State Council(Articles28and29,Chapter5in the State Budget Law,1994).That meant local governments,at any level,were not allowed to have budget de?cits without the permission of the State Council.As we will see later in this paper, this may not rule out the possibilities for the local governments to borrow one way or another,but this State Budget Law served as a key to understanding the public debt issues in China.We will see how the divergence between the Law and the reality occurred,but it is this State Budget Law that has de?ned many events in China’s economy.

2.3The Central Bank Law(zhong yang yin hang fa)

The Central Bank Law,which passed in1995,regulates the relationship between the gov-ernments(particularly the central government)and the Central Bank.It actually isolated the central bank from government?nancing as it said that the People’s Bank of China (the Central Bank)should not lend any money to the central government,and needless to say local governments or government departments at any level The People’s Bank of China cannot subscribe to or underwrite government bonds(Articles28and29,Chapter 5,the Central Bank Law,1995).The central bank in China is responsible for controlling the money supply and for conducting monetary policy,so this Law cuts off the channel of printing money to?nance the government’s de?cits.

This Law is also a key to understand both the public debt issues and the relationship between public?nancing and monetary expansion.Unlike the USA and some other countries,China’s Ministry of Finance is not the institution that prints money notes (there are no“treasury notes,”only“bank notes”in China,literally),and any debt made by the central government must be someone else’s(not the Central Bank’s)credit.So in?ation must be the consequence of loose monetary policy,not the overstretched?scal policy or?scal debt per se.

2.4Land Remising Fee Management Acts(Tu di chu rang jin guan li ban fa)

Land remising fees have become a large item in total national government revenues in the past few years.These fees were regulated by the Land Remising Fee Management Acts that provided that the revenues and expenditures from public land remising are sup-posed to go into the local governments’special budgets and be managed separately (Article4,Chapter1,Land Remising Fee Management Acts,2006).That is to say,the land remising fee,which has played an increasingly large role in local government rev-enues,has never gone into the central government’s budget.Actually,the massive invest-ment in local public infrastructures has been largely?nanced by land revenues.

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Gang Fan and Yan Lv China’s Public Debt Although the new budgetary reform since2010require the inclusion of all land remising into the total government budgetary revenues,this land revenue has been counted in a special“self-balanced”account.It can be in“surplus”in the sense that there is some leftover for the future spending,but that“surplus”will not be moved into the ?scal budget to become part of the?scal surplus.The account cannot be in de?cit as current expenditure cannot surpass the sum of its current revenue plus previous balance (surplus),given the nature of this special“self-balanced”account.If land revenues decline due to falling land prices,for example,local governments have to cut their invest-ment plans.Therefore,although the land revenues may cause certain problems in the economy,they are not very relevant directly to the issue of public debt.We will not discuss this part of revenue separately in our discussion of China’s public debt.

Thanks to these legal institutions set up in early1990s,China has so far been running relatively solid?scal balances,and the government debt problem is limited,and not out of control.

However,there are“informal institutions”that emerged as ways to get around the formal institutions.There is no law in China that forbids the“state-owned enterprises”(SOEs)from borrowing from either banks or the public for the public projects,on behalf of the governments at various levels.Those SOEs are called“governments’borrowing platforms.”As a result,there are still problems associated with“local public debt”in China,which we will discuss in more details later in this paper.

3.China’s Government Budget and Fiscal Policy:The Basic Situation

3.1Overall budgetary situation

National government revenues increased with the growth of GDP every year,and as shown in Figure1,the growth rate of these revenues exceeded the GDP growth rate,in both nominal and real terms,since the“Tax Sharing System”was established.The?scal de?cit has been relatively low and quite sustainable in recent years(see Figure1).Even in 2009and2010when government implemented stimulus policies to counter the effects of the global?nancial crisis,the formal de?cits only amounted to2.3and1.7%of GDP,respectively.

China’s social pension funds are separate from the government?scal budget,and pension contributions are collected separately from taxes.Social pension funds now are still not yet uni?ed,and they are currently run by public entities at various levels,includ-ing a national social pension fund,which are responsible for raising and managing the pension funds and for paying the https://www.sodocs.net/doc/808437390.html,ernments at various levels do have some social pension responsibilities,but they mainly include the pensions of civil servants,and subsidies for certain historical pension liabilities(recently,also for rural pension funds since the pension reform in mid-1990s).In2010,the expenditures on these three catego-ries were2.8%,2.4%,and0.2%of?scal revenues(Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China,2010).The total amount of expenditure was only6.4%of?scal rev-enues,which was not a large portion of the?scal responsibility so far.

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As shown in Figure 2,until now,the overall ?nancial situation of social pension funds has been one of the large surpluses,and we do not expect that they will run into debt in the foreseeable future.Therefore,in discussing public debt,we leave it out.One of the major causes for current European public debt crisis is pension fund de?cits.

Why

Figure 1China’s basic ?scal situation.

Source:China Economic Information Network Statistic Database (updated in 2011),which is managed by State Information Center in China.GDP ,gross domestic

product.

Figure 2Social pension funds situation:1990–2010.

Source:China Economic Information Network Statistic Database (updated in 2011),which is managed by State Information Center in China.GDP ,gross domestic product.

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Gang Fan and Yan Lv China’s Public Debt is China immune from this problem?The answers to this question are that:China just started to build up its universal coverage social pension program10years ago,not150 years ago like Europe;only those who have non-farming jobs(most of whom are very young)have been joining the program;and the majority of the older rural population has been left out of the system.This is quite unlike other countries where everyone has been in the system for the past150years.3China’s population may be aging rapidly,but the social pension program is still young!Nevertheless,China should take heed of the European and Japanese problems,and learn the good lessons from the crisis to ensure future balance!

According to the Central Bank Law,the government is forbidden to borrow from the Central Bank.However,the central government can deposit its net savings(actual surplus after spending)with the Central Bank.The balance of this deposit has been staying at about RMB2–3trillion(about US$0.5trillion)or about6–7%of China’s GDP in the most recent2years(Financial Institutions Statistics,various years).There are many normal reasons for why the government has deposits with the Central Bank while running a budgetary de?cit.However,it seems hard to explain deposits at the level of7% of GDP by those normal reasons such as the time lag between revenues and expenditure. One special reason could be that sometimes the central government slows down pay-ments rather than spending the money according to the budgetary schedule.That was actually the case in2009.In such a case,we can assume that part of the budget de?cits are corrected during the budgetary execution process so that the total government debt should be balanced against by these deposits.

3.2China’s?scal policy

Generally speaking,the Chinese government has been so far prudent in using?scal policy in most cases of countercyclical macroeconomic management.Over the past20 years,only twice did it use?scal policies to stimulate the economy.The?rst time was in 1997–1999to deal with a domestic“credit crunch”caused by massive nonperforming loans(NPLs)and some adverse impacts of the South-East Asia?nancial crisis.The second time was in2008–2009to tackle the panic caused by the global?nancial crisis that originated in the USA.In both cases,the budget de?cits were no more than3%of GDP,and the stimulus policy lasted no more than3years(see Figure1).

The main instrument of?scal policy is the central government spending on infra-structures and some social programs in recent years such as the“New Village Movement”and the“Affordable Housing program.”Tax rates have been not been used as a?scal policy instrument in most cases,either in expansionary or in contractionary situations. The only exception is decreasing or increasing the tax rebates for exports.During periods of overheating,one form of tightening policy is actually“administrative policy,”namely direct control of local governments’or state sectors’spending on investment projects, sometimes even by putting direct restrictions on private sector investments.In an economy where some agents,such as local governments and SOEs,do not care much about the return on capital or interest rates,such direct administrative control may be the only and/or the most effective countercyclical policy.

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One of the complications of the operation of Chinese ?scal policy is that it may be twisted with monetary policies.For instance,during the 2008–2009period of the global ?nancial crisis,the expansionary ?scal stimulus package included a request for an increase in local governments’spending on public investment as a supplement to the central government’s investment.However,the only way through which the local gov-ernments could meet this target was to borrow from banks,so the ?scal stimulus policy must be accommodated by a monetary policy that allows local governments to borrow.As will be seen later in this paper,we will actually treat this kind of local government borrowing (for public projects)as part of total government debt that is a result of the ?scal stimulus policy.

4.Formal Government Debt

4.1Central government debt

The central government resorts to domestic government debt and external debt to ?nance its ?scal de?cits in China.At the end of 2010,the outstanding amount of external debt was RMB 55.8billion or US$8.39billion,and the outstanding amount of domestic debt was RMB 6698.2billion (Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China,2010).The total debt ratio (total debt/?scal revenues)and liability ratio (total debt/GDP)of the central government at the end of 2010were 158.93%of annual ?scal rev-enues and 16.96%of GDP ,respectively.Figure 3presents data on two risk indicators for central government debt in recent years,which shows that the risks are reasonably low by any

standard.

Figure 3Risk indicators on central government debts:2005–2010.

Note:Debt ratio means the ratio of debt stocks to ?scal revenue,and liability ratio means the ratio of debt stocks to gross domestic product.

Sources:Calculated based on the data from China Statistic Yearbook 2010and Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China (2010).

China’s Public Debt Gang Fan and Yan Lv

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External debt has not been the main ?nancing tool for the Chinese government.The amount raised by external bond issues was just around 1%of the amount raised domes-tically every year.4Sometimes,to avoid underestimation of the risk of government over-borrowing,we may assume that the government is responsible for all the foreign debts of the country and add the other foreign debts to the government’s external debt (Fan,1999b).Even doing so,China’s total external debt is still relatively small:the liability ratio of total foreign debts has not exceeded 10%of GDP in recent years as shown in Table 1.Considering the large amount of China’s foreign reserves,the problem of “sover-eign debt”in China is minimal.Therefore,we just simply count government foreign debt into our estimates of total public debt that we present later.

As China holds US$3.3trillion in of?cial foreign exchange reserves,some people may think that China’s “net public debt”should be much smaller if the value of these reserves is netted out.However,the “of?cial”holder of China’s foreign exchange reserves is the Central Bank,not the Ministry of Finance,meaning that the ultimate ownership of the reserve belongs to the hundreds of millions of bank depositors,not the government.Only in the case when the Ministry of Finance has bought the reserves from the banking system 5should we count it as a government asset.However,in order to purchase the reserves in,the government has to issue more public debt!The eventual balance may Table 1China’s external debt situation:2005–2010

2005

20062007200820092010External debt stock,public publically

guaranteed (current US$,billion)

85.2388.2287.7989.2894.0490.18As a %of gross domestic product (GDP)

3.81 3.32 2.60 2.06 1.88 1.52External debt stock,total (current US$,

billion)

282.95322.76373.08379.80432.20548.55As a %of GDP 12.6512.1411.038.788.669.26Source:World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (updated in 2011).

Table 2Government debt in the late 1990s

1997

19981999Nonperforming loans (NPLs)as a %of gross domestic product (GDP)

25.0527.1928.5Formal debt as a %of GDP

22.8214.4527.03Government comprehensive liabilities?as a %of GDP 47.951.6455.53?Government comprehensive liabilities refer to all potential liabilities,de?ned as the ratio of sum of government debt,foreign debt,and NPLs.

Source:Fan (1999b).

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China’s Public Debt Gang Fan and Yan Lv remain unchanged if the purchase is mainly?nanced by issues of debt revenue as in the case of Japan.6This means that the public debt we are analyzing in this paper is already the“net debt”of the Chinese government.

4.2Formal local government debt

In terms of the formal?scal institutions,China’s local governments can only borrow in the following two ways:(i)credits from the policy banks.There are very few policy banks in China,and the loan quota of the policy banks should be assigned by the Central Bank every year.So this item should not be large in quantity.It is estimated that the outstand-ing of local government policy loans was RMB1.7trillion,or3.7%of GDP in the middle of2011(Conference records from China Banking Regulatory Commission);and(ii) foreign credits.This is through central government debt?nancing,and is already calcu-lated in the consolidated balance,so it is not an extra either.In summary,the only gov-ernment formal debt in addition to the central government debts is the local government borrowings from the policy banks,which amounted to about3.7%of GDP in2011. https://www.sodocs.net/doc/808437390.html,rmal Debt:Public Debt beyond Government Fiscal Debt

5.1What and how do the local governments borrow under the current

legal framework?

As the local governments are forbidden to borrow,either from the public or from the commercial banks,the only way for them to extend their budgets is to borrow through some other entities,either a local government-owned corporation(such as city construc-tion company)or a public?nancial institution(such as provincial trust fund),which take the bank loans on behalf of the local governments and which are backed up by either the government credibility(government guarantee against future?scal revenues), and/or some collaterals such as land or other public properties,and/or a legally secured future cash?ow of the projects concerned.The corporations or institutions that carry out these borrowings are,therefore,called the“platforms”for local governments’bor-rowings.The loans involved are mostly used for investment in local public infrastructure or public housing programs and long maturity terms of10–20years.By their nature, the debts owed by the local entities are indeed public or should be counted at least as “quasi-public debt.”

As mentioned earlier,most“platforms”establishments are for the?nancing of local projects that local governments should have invested in,such as public infrastructure. Some of these platforms also take responsibility for constructing and managing those projects.The bank loan is the main component of their debts,and the government asset injections are the main part of their assets.Some of them are pro?t-making organiza-tions,while others are not.The key point is that they all have tight connections with local governments,in terms of both?nancing and personnel.In most cases,the local govern-ment is the largest shareholder in the“platform,”and the management is arranged by the local government.So the operating motivation and the decision making both actually come from the local government.

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Gang Fan and Yan Lv China’s Public Debt Technically,these“platforms”are independent legal entitles,which means that they should take responsibility for full repayment of their liabilities.However,as capital of these platforms is mainly provided by the local governments,using?scal revenue or public assets such as land,it is these governments’assets that guarantee the platforms’liabilities.Furthermore,some debts are just guaranteed by the local governments’cred-ibility,or forced by the governments’power,resulting in some“platforms”having extremely high liability/asset ratios.The high dependence on the land remising revenue, and the lack of guaranteed assets,makes insolvency risk high.The of?cial data show that by the end of2011,46.75%of the debts owed by the“platforms”were the direct liabili-ties of local governments,and34.85%of them were the guaranteed liabilities of local governments(National Audit Of?ce[NAO],2010).

In addition to the credits to the local“platforms,”?nancial institutions in China extend credits to SOEs,too.In the1990s,Fan(1999b)counted the NPLs owed by the SOEs as“quasi-public debts.”Table2shows China’s government debt situation in the 1990s,and at that time the NPLs owed by the SOEs accounted for the bulk of the govern-ment debt.Should we count those borrowings by the SOEs now as public debt as well? Things are quite different now from the1990s for a number of reasons.First,a large great number of small-and medium-sized loss-making SOEs were privatized in the late 1990s and the early2000s.Some large SOEs have been partially privatized with up to 30–40%of their shares held by the public or privately owned“strategic investors.”As a result,these enterprises are pro?t oriented and behave as normal commercial entities to a certain extent,even though the government’s objectives and government controls may still play roles in their operation.In a sense,the SOEs nowadays are“new SOEs”that are distinguishable from early SOEs that heavily relied on government?nancing.Second, most large SOEs are now quite pro?table.Third,after the serious cleaning up of NPLs in mid to late1990s,the NPLs ratios of all Chinese commercial banks are really low as far as the normal SOEs are concerned,around2%in most cases.7They can be neglected in terms of their size in our discussion of public debt.

It should be pointed out here as well that only those debts that are used for the public programs such as investment in public infrastructures should be counted as the public debts.In the case of normal SOEs,we should only count NPLs as the quasi-public debt due to the government responsibility for bailing them out.Therefore,in this paper,we only identify the borrowings of local“platforms”with special purposes for public invest-ment programs as public debt,and exclude the loans to SOEs for commercial purposes.

5.22008–2009stimulus package and the surge of local public debts

After the reform and enforcement of new laws as well as clearing up the NPLs,China’s ?scal situation as well as public debt problem was quite stabilized since early2000s. Fiscal de?cits remained low,within2%of GDP during2000–2008,and the debt of“local borrowing platforms”remained as low as a little more than RMB1trillion at the begin-ning of2008,under4%of2008s GDP(Wei,2010).

Then,the global?nancial crisis occurred in late2008.Facing the possibility of a further contraction of the economy,the central authorities adopted a stimulus package

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China’s Public Debt Gang Fan and Yan Lv that included4trillion of central government spending(for2years spending)that was mainly on infrastructure investment,and a“relaxed monetary policy.”The policy measures that are relevant to the current discussion include,?rst,permitting local gov-ernments to issue bonds with a yearly quota of RMB200billion in2009,2010,and2011. Second,the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the People’s Bank of China issued documents and encouraged,for the?rst time,local governments to establish“bor-rowing platforms”to expand their investment?nancing(public documents no.29issued by People’s Banks of China and China Banking Regulatory Commission).Then,the “borrowing platforms”bloomed.One level of local government may have several“plat-forms,”and even the county level has“platforms.”By the end of2010,the number of “platforms”amounted to6576,of which165were provincial,1648were prefectural,and 4762were county platforms(NAO,2010).8The?nancing channel was not restricted to policy banks,but any commercial banks(Wei,2010).According to the estimates of the China Banking Regulatory Commission,in the year2009,the debts owed by the local borrowing platforms jumped to7trillion,or20.6%of GDP.This has meant that the public debt problem has returned.

When allowed,all the local governments want to borrow as much as they can.Why? Because they all want to have more funds for investment,and they want to have a higher growth rate of GDP as their“achievement”and want to outpace other regions in the competition among localities.Such“local competition”has been one of major driving forces for China’s growth.Local government of?cials do not need to worry too much about debt repayment,given the long maturity of the debts and the relative short term of their of?ce in one local place(Zhou,2004).All current governments would love to have more projects?nished in their own terms while leaving all the debts to their successors in the future.That is why the central government has to use some administrative,and sometimes political,tools to limit local government borrowings.Economic means such as interest rate adjustment do not seem to be really effective here compared with the “principle of the loans.”

By the end of2009,the central authorities realized the problem and started to act to control the situation(Public document no.19published by the State Council,2010).The banquet ended,and the restrictions on lending to local platforms were resumed(Public document no.244published by the General Of?ce of the China Banking Regulatory Commission,2010).By the middle of2010,the lending to local“platforms”had almost stopped.

5.3How large and how bad are the local debts

Although the operation of local“platforms”is not totally transparent,they cannot misre-port their debt?gures as most of money they received was from banks that are subject to a strict legal responsibility of accurate book keeping.The of?cial data,which basically comes from a nationwide investigation of the banking system,show that the total local government debt was RMB10.72trillion,or28%of GDP by the end of2010.Of this, 90%was put into use,and the remainder was still saved as cash.Eighty percent of debt revenues were from bank loans,amounting to RMB8.47trillion,the equivalent of17.7%

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of total bank credit at the end of 2010(NAO,2010).9Table 3shows estimates of the local government debt situation in recent years.It can be seen that local government debt increased gradually,between 20%and 30%every year before 2008,but the debt scale surged by more than 60%in 2009,from RMB 5.58trillion or 17.8%of GDP in 2008to RMB 9.04trillion,or 26.6%of GDP .Fortunately,the growth rate decreased rapidly after that,which was about 18%in 2010.The government’s loan share of total banking credit also reached nearly 20%in 2009,but it declined to 17.9%in 2010.

At the end of 2010,all governments at the provincial level and prefectural level,and 98%county governments,were running debts.The provincial level’s share of total local government debt was 29.96%,and the prefectural level’s share and county level’s share were 43.51%and 26.53%,respectively (NAO,2010).The lower the level of the govern-ment the debt belongs to,the riskier it could be,in general.By the end of 2010,20%of prefectural and 3.6%of county-level governments have direct debt ratios surpassing 100%(NAO,2010).Since the Tax Sharing System does not exist below the provincial level,lower level governments have a more serious shortage of ?scal revenue,and their revenues sources are not https://www.sodocs.net/doc/808437390.html,nd remising fees have played a large part in prefectural and county-level government ?nancing,to the extent that nearly 80%of prefectural debts and half of county debts are guaranteed by land remising fees (NAO,2010).However,the negative impact of recent macro policies on land prices will decrease the collateral values.

Table 3Local government debt situation:1999–2010

Year Government debt (trillion yuan)

Governments’bank loans

(trillion yuan)Total bank

credit (trillion yuan)GDP (trillion yuan)Government loans/total credit (%)Government debts/GDP (%)19990.600.52

9.378.97 5.59 6.7120000.800.69

9.949.92 6.988.032001 1.050.92

11.2310.978.179.612002 1.39 1.21

13.1312.039.2411.592003 1.76 1.54

15.9013.589.6612.992004 2.23 1.94

17.7415.9910.9513.972005 2.83 2.46

19.4718.4912.6215.282006 3.57 3.11

22.5321.6313.8016.522007 4.52 3.93

26.1726.5815.0317.012008 5.58 4.86

30.3431.4016.0117.7820099.047.87

39.9734.0519.6826.55201010.72

8.5847.9238.8017.9027.63Sources:Government debts and government loans data are estimates based on the data from NAO (2010).The data on total banking credit are taken from the Financial Institutions Statistics on People Bank of China website,and the GDP data come from China Statistic Yearbook 2010.Gang Fan and Yan Lv China’s Public Debt ?2012The Authors

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When discussing the risk of local government debt,its structural characteristics must be taken into consideration.First,the solvency of local governments is different depend-ing on their local economic situations and ?scal revenues.The relatively wealthy eastern regions have lower liability ratios than the poorer western regions.As is shown in Table 4,the debt to GDP ratio was 21%for the eastern regions,lower than the average level,while the western regions’ratio reached 36%.It will take 2.1years of ?scal revenues to pay off the current debts in the eastern regions,while it will take 3.7years of ?scal rev-enues in the western regions.Therefore,the debts owed by the western regions are riskier than those of the eastern regions.However,according to the of?cial data from NAO (2010),the debts of the eastern regions were nearly half of total debt,and the share of total debt in the western and central regions were 27.29%and 23.06%,respectively.

Second,it should be noted that not all debts depend totally on ?scal revenues.Some of the funds raised through debt were used to invest in programs,such as transportation,industry facilities,and energy resources,that would generate net cash ?ows in the future,which can be used to repay the debt.According to Table 5,this debt amounted to nearly 30%of total debt.There are some programs,such as those for agricultural and conser-vancy,and parts of city construction,that will not bring in cash ?ows directly,but that will stimulate the local economy and increase future ?scal revenue.

Third,the maturity structure of debt is critical when analyzing repayment risk.Gen-erally speaking,the shorter the maturity of the debt,the higher is the risk.From Table 6,we can observe that the debt due in the following 2years,2012and 2013,is RMB 3tril-lion,and only makes up 6.5%of the GDP and 29%of ?scal revenue in 2011s.Other loans will mature in 5–15years.

The questions relating to local “platforms”are not only about the expansion of their numbers and the scale of their debt scales since 2009but also about institutional irregu-larities.By the end of 2010,there were 6576“platforms,”with an average of 5in every province,4in every prefecture,and 2in every county (NAO,2010).The balance sheets of these “platforms”are not stable,as their assets depend heavily on injections of public

Table 4Regional distribution of local government debts

Eastern

region

Western region Central region Outstanding debts at the end of 2010(trillion yuan)

5.32 2.93 2.47Fiscal revenues in 2010(trillion yuan)

2.50.790.77GDP in 2010(trillion yuan)

25.058.1410.51Debt/?scal revenue (years)?

2.1

3.7 3.1Debt as a %of GDP 21%36%23%?The debt/?scal revenue ratio is the number of years used to pay off the debts using ?scal revenues based on the year of 2010.

Sources:Authors estimates based on the data from NAO (2010)and the China Economic Information Network Statistic Database.

China’s Public Debt Gang Fan and Yan Lv ?2012The Authors

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214

Gang Fan and Yan Lv China’s Public Debt Table5Uses of debt revenues

The use of debt revenues Value(trillion yuan)Percentage(%) City construction 3.5336.72 Transportation 2.3924.89

Land buying 1.0210.62

Social welfare related0.929.54 Agricultural and water conservancy construction0.46 4.77 Environment protection0.27 2.84 Solving local?nancial risk0.11 1.15 Industry input0.13 1.33 Energy resources0.020.25

Other0.767.89

Total9.61100.00 Source:NAO(2010).

Table6Maturity year of current local government debts

Maturity year Value(trillion year)Percentage(%) 2011 2.6224.49

2012 1.8417.17

2013 1.2211.37 20140.999.28 20150.807.48

2016and later 3.2430.21

Total10.72100.00 Source:NAO(2010).

assets,and their liabilities are mainly in the form of bank loans.By investigating the “platforms”in Chongqing province,Tsui(2011)found that the balance sheets of these “platforms”could deteriorate quickly if there is a sharp downturn in economic growth.

Let us examine the?nancial institutions that have extended credits to these“plat-forms.”For the?ve state-owned banks10%of their total credits were“platform”loans, which was much lower than the average level of17%(Tsui,2011).Therefore,attention should be paid to the fact that the relatively middle-sized and small-sized banks,espe-cially the local commercial banks,have carried more“platform”loans.

In summary,although the size of local government debt grew sharply in2009, picking up to28%of GDP by2010,the default risk of this debt is not as high as it may appear.Half of the debt is issued in the eastern region,which has more?nancial resources to repay it.Nearly30%of the debts can be repaid by revenues from the ?2012The Authors

Asian Economic Policy Review?2012Japan Center for Economic Research215

China’s Public Debt Gang Fan and Yan Lv program that the debt funds were invested in.The debt with a maturity less than2years constitutes less than30%of the total,which is not a big threat.However,more attention should be paid to the debt of lower level governments because of their limited?scal revenues,and the balance sheets of middle-sized and small-sized banks since they carry more“platform”loans than the average level of banks.

5.4Policies to deal with local borrowing

In2010,threatened by a surge of local government debt,the State Council put forward a package of policies to strengthen the management of local government debt,followed by a series of detailed measures by the Ministry of Finance and the China Banking Regula-tory Commission to regulate the behavior of local governments and banks.10First,the central government stopped most loans to local“platforms.”Under this new regulation, only a few public programs,such as high-speed railways and“affordable housing”projects could get new loans.A joint investigation was conducted by the central supervi-sory authorities to get a clearer picture of reality.The second part was to manage the risks of the existing loans to enforce the repayment.It was required that the loans should be transferred into a repayment scheme on installment basis,under which the principal and interest must be paid twice a year from now on every year until the maturity.The legality and the value of mortgaged property was also checked and enforced.For example,it was regulated that the loans mortgaged with nonproductive public assets like schools,hospitals,and parks must be replaced by other productive assets.

On the creditor’s side,all banks have been requested to increase their risk reserve funds.In2010–2011,major commercial banks were allowed to lower their dividend remittance by5%to raise more funds for improving their risk management position.

In addition to risk control,the central government is trying to explore some new formats for local government debt.Starting from mid-2011,local government bonds were sold in the bond market.The State Council has permitted four localities,Shanghai, Zhejiang,Guangdong,and Shenzhen,to issue local government bonds.However,the maximum size of their debt is still restricted by the central government,and the payment is also made by the Ministry of Finance,only the issuing process is organized by the local government itself.The debt quota for these four localities in2011was RMB7.1billion, RMB8.9billion,RMB6.9billion,and RMB2.2billion,respectively,and the total was RMB25.1billion or0.5%of GDP.The interest rate was almost the same as that for the corresponding central government bonds.

Therefore,these bonds by their nature are still centrally issued bonds,and actually they do not violate the State Budget Law.This is a supplementary arrangement with an unchanged legal framework.Only the users’responsibility of repayment now is clearer. The next step for reform should be either an amendment of the Budget Law to allow local governments to have the right of issue bonds to a certain extent,or,without the amendment,to institutionalize this kind of“quota system”and to apply it to all localities. The issue here is that local governments do need debt?nancing from time to time.If the scale of debt?nancing is within the limits justi?able by reasonable(conservative) assessments of their?scal and?nancial conditions,it is a good thing.The previous

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arrangement,which emphasized the risk control but which totally denied the debt ?nancing needs of the local governments,may have gone too far.Now may be the time to think about some more realistic approaches with greater transparency.

6.Concluding Remarks:China’s Overall Public Debt Risk,Now and

in the Future

Combining all our earlier discussions,estimates of the total public debt situations in 2010and2011are reported in Table7.From the table,it can be seen that the total public debt in2010and2011were estimated to be RMB16.8trillion and RMB18.6 Table7Total public debt estimation

20102011

Value (trillion yuan)Ratio to

GDP

(%)

Total(%,

cumulated

downward)

Value

(trillion

yuan)

Ratio to

GDP

(%)

Total(%,

cumulated

downward)

GDP39.0100.047.0100.0

Central government

debt

6.71

7.217.27.215.315.3

Debt of central

government sector

1.9 4.92

2.1 1.9 4.019.4

Fiscal deposit-2.5-6.415.7-2.6-5.513.8

Debt of local

government

10.727.443.112.125.739.6

Total public debt16.843.118.639.6

Notes:1.Central government debt includes central government domestic debt as well as external debt,which means the formal central government debt mentioned in the text of the paper.

2.The data on the debt of central government sector just include the debt of the Ministry

of Railways,which is the largest debtor among the central government’s ministries.

3.The debts of local borrowing platforms were included in the debts of local government.

4.The data on the debts of the central government sector and debts of the local

government in2011are for the end of June2011.Here,we assume that there was no

growth in the debts of the local government and central government sectors during the

second half of2011.

Sources:The data on the debts of local government in2010are from NAO,and the debts of the central government sector in2010are from the balance sheet of the Ministry of Railways.The data of the debts of the local government,and the central government sector in2011,refer to the conference records from the China Banking Regulatory Commission.Gross domestic product data are taken from the China Statistic Bulletin2010and2011.The data on central government debts come from Budget Accounting Reports for2010and2011.The data on?scal deposits come from the Financial Institution Statistic of People’s Bank of China for2010and2011.

Gang Fan and Yan Lv China’s Public Debt

?2012The Authors

Asian Economic Policy Review?2012Japan Center for Economic Research217

China’s Public Debt Gang Fan and Yan Lv trillion,which was43.1%and39.6%of GDP,respectively.Therefore,even though a surge in local government debt occurred in2009,the total public debt to GDP ratio never exceeded50%,and due to the adoption of policies on restricting and supervising local government borrowings since2010,the total public debt to GDP ratio declined by 3.5percentage points.

The basic conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that China’s public debt situ-ation is still quite sound.

The sudden surge of local public debt during the2008–2009global?nancial crises was a special episode for China.It was a good lesson.From now on,even if the European debt problem turns into another?nancial crisis with the same magnitude as the one that happened in the USA,the Chinese central authorities will never again adopt similar massive stimulus package and would never again allow local governments to borrow without a limit or without tight control.

Although the growth rate and the enormity of the local debts were scary in2009,it was practically only a1-year story,and the story has stopped https://www.sodocs.net/doc/808437390.html,pared with the growth rate of GDP at12–13%and of tax revenues of over20%,as long as the local debt stops growing,it is very manageable,and its relevance will diminish with economic growth.With policy actions to remedy the problem,the debt problem may diminish even quicker.It is quite certain that this1-year practice during global?nancial crisis will not cause a Chinese?nancial crisis or a“hard landing,”as some foreign commentators put it.There is no way for it to be explosive any more.For a large developing country like China,it is always a dif?cult job to maintain a balance between the drive for local growth and macroeconomic stability.Without a tradition of local autonomy with accountability and?scal federalism,?scal discipline and?nancial supervision must be enforced one way or another without compromise.With the new lessons from the developed coun-tries,in addition to the lessons from Latin America in the1960s to1980s and South-East Asia in the1990s,China should stick to?scal prudence if it wants to continue its growth story without a major disruption caused by?nancial and economic crises.Further eco-nomic development and market-oriented institutional reforms may cause problems here.Even though some things may be changing rapidly,it may take a long time(100 years?)for China to establish an ef?cient and stable economic system.But as long as ?scal prudence can prevail,serious problems can be avoided,and improvements can be accumulated without large ups and downs.

Although China’s current?scal position is relatively solid,the future risks are worthy of serious understanding.First,the economic growth rate may be slowing down,and so may the growth rate of?scal revenue.Second,so far,the main motivation of local gov-ernments to borrow more is to?nance public investment projects and to achieve higher GDP growth to have greater“political achievements.”With the enlargement of social dis-parities,the pressures for increases in spending on social programs will be added to the list of debt motivation.Therefore,the policy now should focus on more long-term issues and further reforms of China’s?scal and?nancial system,learning the new lessons from the USA and European debt crisis.

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Gang Fan and Yan Lv China’s Public Debt Notes

1Although there were frequent changes in?scal system during1980s,this was referred to as a period of?scal decentralization,on both the revenue and the expenditure sides.

2Central government?xed revenues include tariff,the consumption tax,value added tax(V AT), revenues collected by customs,income taxes collected from central enterprises,banks and nonbank?nancial intermediaries;the remitted pro?ts,income taxes,business taxes,and urban construction and maintenance taxes of the railroad,bank headquarters and insurance compa-nies;and resource taxes on offshore oil extraction.Local government?xed revenues consist of business taxes(excluding those that were stated as being central government?xed revenues), income taxes and pro?t remittances of local enterprises,urban land use taxes,individual income taxes,the?xed asset investment orientation tax,urban construction and maintenance taxes,real estate taxes,the vehicle utilization tax,stamp tax,the animal slaughter tax,agricul-tural taxes,title tax,capital gains tax on land,state land sales revenues,resource taxes derived from land-based resources.(Corporate income tax is shared between central and local govern-ments in a?xed ratio since the year of2002,instead of divided by subordination.)The V AT is shared with75%for the central government and25%for local governments.The securities investment tax is shared too,50–50.However,the expenditure responsibilities of each govern-ment did not change much in this reform.

3Although the rural social pension program started from2009included elder rural persons into the fund,it absorbed young rural persons into the program,too.At the end of2010,102.8 million people participated in this program,but only29million people had reached the pen-sionable age.In2010,rural pension fund revenues were RMB45.3billion,and fund expendi-tures were RMB20billion,and the cumulated balance of the pension fund was RBM42.3 billion(Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of People’s Republic of China, 2010).

4In2010,issues of foreign debt were only RMB9.84billion,while the issues of domestic debt were RMB1775.1billion(Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China,2010).

5Actually,it did in the case of?nancing China Investment Corporation for$200billion in2006. 6There have been policy recommendations in recent years to transfer the foreign exchange reserves to the Ministry of Finance to isolate the money supply from the accumulation of foreign reserves by the Central Bank,as is done in some other countries.

7We refer to the document about the NPL situation published by the China Banking Regulatory Commission,and we assume that loans to the SOEs and other sectors have a similar quality of repayment.

8There are other estimates of the number of“platforms,”but here we take the of?cial audit data published by the NAO as relatively authority.

9The of?cial report by NAO categorized local government debts into three items according to the payment responsibility taken by government:direct liabilities constitute62.62%;guaran-teed liabilities make up21.80%;and related liabilities are15.58%.In this paper,we take all these debts equal as the total debts paid off by government.

10Documents of the State Council(2010)no.19,the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Repub-lic of China(2010)no.412,the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China(2010) no.22,the China Banking Regulatory Commission(2010)no.34,and the China Banking Regulatory Commission(2010)no.191,are all directed to the recti?cation of problems of the local borrowing“platforms.”

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China’s Public Debt Gang Fan and Yan Lv

References

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系统概要设计文档

系统概要设计文档
1 / 18

目录
系统概要设计文档 ....................................................................................................... 1b5E2RGbCAP 目录 ................................................................................................................................2p1EanqFDPw 1 引言 .............................................................................................................................. 3DXDiTa9E3d 1.1 编写目的及阅读建议 ...................................................................................... 3RTCrpUDGiT 1.2 系统概述 ......................................................................................................... 35PCzVD7HxA 1.3 文档概述 ............................................................................................................. 3jLBHrnAILg 1.4 设计原则与设计要求 ......................................................................................3xHAQX74J0X 2 引用文件 ...................................................................................................................... 3LDAYtRyKfE 3 设计概述 ....................................................................................................................... 4Zzz6ZB2Ltk 3.1 功能需求规定 .................................................................................................... 4dvzfvkwMI1 3.2 运行环境 ........................................................................................................... 4rqyn14ZNXI 4 系统体系结构设计 ..................................................................................................... 4EmxvxOtOco 4.1 系统总体设计 ................................................................................................... 4SixE2yXPq5 4.1.1 概述 ........................................................................................................ 46ewMyirQFL 4.1.2 设计思想 ............................................................................................... 5kavU42VRUs 4.1.3 基本处理流程 ........................................................................................ 6y6v3ALoS89 4.1.4 系统数据结构设计 ............................................................................... 9M2ub6vSTnP 4.4 接口设计 ........................................................................................................ 100YujCfmUCw 4.4.1 用户接口 ............................................................................................. 10eUts8ZQVRd 4.4.2 外部接口 ............................................................................................ 10sQsAEJkW5T 4.4.3 内部接口 ............................................................................................. 11GMsIasNXkA 5 运行设计 ..................................................................................................................... 11TIrRGchYzg 5.1 系统初始化 ................................................................................................... 117EqZcWLZNX 5.2 运行控制 ........................................................................................................... 11lzq7IGf02E 5.3 运行结束 .......................................................................................................... 11zvpgeqJ1hk 6 系统出错处理设计 ..................................................................................................... 11NrpoJac3v1 6.1 出错信息 ..........................................................................................................111nowfTG4KI 6.2 补救措施 .......................................................................................................... 12fjnFLDa5Zo 7 系统维护设计 ............................................................................................................. 12tfnNhnE6e5 附录 ............................................................................................................................. 12HbmVN777sL
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算法设计与分析课程设计(完整版)

HUNAN CITY UNIVERSITY 算法设计与分析课程设计 题目：求最大值与最小值问题 专业： 学号： 姓名： 指导教师： 成绩： 二0年月日

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名词动用。１２、郑人病之。P129 病：名词用作意动。１３、象有齿而焚其身。P130 焚：动词用作使动。１４、宣子说，乃轻弊。P130 轻：形容词用作使动，使。。。轻。〈苏秦连横约纵〉１５、今先生俨然不运千里而庭教之。P182 远：形容词用作意动。１６、明言章理，兵甲愈起。P183 明、章：用作使动。 1 １７、辨言伟服。攻战不息。P183 辩、伟：都用作使动，使。。。雄辩，使。。。华美。１８、繁称文辞，天下不冶。P183 文：名词用作使动。１９、夫徒处而致利，安坐而广地。P183 广：形容词用作使动，使。。。广。２０、言语相结，天下为一。P183 言语：名词作状语。２１、今欲并天下，凌万乘，诎敌国。制海内，子元元。臣诸候。非兵不可。P183 诎：用作使动，使。。。屈服；子：名词用作使动，使。。。成为子女；臣：名词用作使动，使。。。成为臣子。２２、约纵散横，以抑强秦。

算法设计与分析详细设计说明书

高校医务收费管理系统研究项目详细设计 第一部分、引言 1.1编写目的 本说明在概要设计的基础上，对高校医务收费管理系统研究项目的各模块、程序、子系统分别进行了实现层面上的要求和说明。根据概要设计说明书中的设计内容，编写详细设计说明书，为开发过程提供系统处理过程的详细说明，使系统开发各类技术人员对整个系统所需实现的功能以及系统的功能模块的划分、实现和数据库的表结构清楚的认识，为整个系统的开发、测试、评定和移交的提供基础，本报告一旦确认后将成为系统开发各类技术人员共同遵守的准则，并为以后的编程工作提供依据。 软件开发小组的产品实现成员应该阅读和参考本说明进行代码的编写、测试。 1.2背景 说明： A、软件系统的名称：高校医务收费管理系统研究项目 B、任务提出者：高校医务人员 开发者：医务收费系统开发小组 实现完成的系统将在高校医务收费的诊断室、门诊、住院部使用，所应用的网络系统是该系统的内部局域网。 C、本系统将是独立的系统，目前不与高校医务收费的财务系统和其他资料系统提供接口， 所产生的输出都是独立的。 本系统将使用SQL Server 2000作为数据库存储系统，SQL Server 2000企业版将由高校医务收费自行购买。

1.3定义 IPO图——输入/处理/输出图，一般用来描述一个程序的功能和机制； VB语言：1991年，美国微软公司推出了Visual Basic(可简称VB），目前的最新版本是VB 2005(VB8)中文版。Visual 意即可视的、可见的，指的是开发像windows操作系统的图形用户界面（Graphic User Interface,GUI）的方法，它不需要编写大量代码去描述界面元素的外观和位置，只要把预先建立好的对象拖放到屏幕上相应的位置即可。SQL全称是“结构化查询语言(Structu red Query Language)”，最早的是IBM的圣约瑟研究实验室为其关系数据库管理系统SYSTEM R开发的一种查询语言，它的前身是SQUARE语言。SQL 语言结构简洁，功能强大，简单易学，所以自从IBM公司1981年推出以来，SQL语言，得到了广泛的应用。医务收费系统：医务收费是帮助医务人员、医务工作人员对医务收费管理软件。 1.4参考资料 相关的文件包括： A、《高校医务收费高校医务收费管理系统研究项目可行性研究报告》； B、《高校医务收费高校医务收费管理系统研究项目概要设计》； 参考资料： ①杨晶《VB程序设计教程与实训》北京-科学出版社2006 ②张海潘《软件工程》北京清华大学出版版社2003 ③李昭原《数据库原理与应用》科学出版社2002 ④徐兰芳, 彭冰《数据库设计与实现》上海-上海交通大学出版社2006 ⑤(美)Wendy Boggs 《UML与Rational Rose 2002从入门到精通》邱仲潘等译北京-电子工业出版社2002 ⑥《金华市发达装配厂库存管理系统KCGL》的可行性分析 ⑦《中华人民共和国国家标准UDC 681．3》 ⑧《计算机软件产品开发文件编制指南GB 8567-88》 第二部分、程序系统的结构 2.1系统结构

算法设计与分析

Ex.1(p20)若将y ← uniform(0, 1) 改为 y ← x, 则上述的算法估计的值是什么？ 解：若将y ←uniform(0, 1) 改为 y ←x，此时有 ，则k++，即 ，此时k++，由于此时x ← uniform(0, 1)，所以k/n=，则此时4k/n=2。所以上述算法估计的值为2。 Ex.2(p23) 在机器上用 估计π值，给出不同的n值及精度。 解：由ppt上p21可知，的大小 ，其中k为落入圆内的数目，n为总数，且π=，即需要计算4k/n。我们先令x ← uniform(0, 1)，y ← uniform(0, 1)。 计算的值，如果小于等于1，那么此时k++。最后计算4k/n的值即可估计此时的π值。代码的主要部分为： 执行结果为：

结果分析：随着N的取值不断地增加，得到的π值也就越来越精确。 Ex.3(p23) 设a, b, c和d是实数，且a ≤ b, c ≤ d, f:[a, b] → [c, d]是一个连续函数，写一概率算法计算积分： 注意，函数的参数是a, b, c, d, n和f, 其中f用函数指针实现，请选一连续函数做实验，并给出实验结果。 解：的值为y=，y=0，x=a，x=b围成的面积。根据之前的例子我们可以知道= k(b-a)d/n。其中k是落在函数y=，x=a，x=b以及y=0所包围区间内的个数。 代码的主要部分为： 运行结果为：

结果分析： 随着N的取值不断地增加，得到的积分值越来越精确。 Ex4(p24). 设ε,δ是(0,1)之间的常数，证明：若I是的正确值，h是由HitorMiss算法返回的值，则当n ≥ I(1-I)/ε2δ时有： Prob[|h-I| < ε] ≥ 1 –δ 上述的意义告诉我们：Prob[|h-I| ≥ε] ≤δ, 即：当n ≥ I(1-I)/ ε2δ时，算法的计算结果的绝对误差超过ε的概率不超过δ，因此我们根据给定ε和δ可以确定算法迭代的次数 () 解此问题时可用切比雪夫不等式，将I看作是数学期望。 证明：由切比雪夫不等式可知： P( | X - E(X) | < ε ) ≥ 1 - D(X) / ε2 由题目知，E(X)=I。且根据题意，我们可知，在HotorMiss算法中，若随机选取n个点，其中k个点在积分范围内，则 。且k的分布为二项分布B(n，I)（在积分范围内或者不在 积分范围内），则 。又因为k=x*n，所以D(X)=I(1-I)/n。再将E(X)和D(X)带入切比雪夫不等式中即可得到 Ex5(p36). 用上述算法，估计整数子集1~n的大小，并分析n对估计值的影响。 解：由题知，集合的大小，通过计算新生成的集合中元素的个数来估计原集合的大小，代码的主体部分如下：

古代汉语练习题 词类活用

古代汉语练习（词类活用） 班级：姓名：学号： 一、简答： 1、什么是古代汉语的词类活用？古代汉语中的词类活用有哪几种？ 2、怎样区别使动用法和意动用法？试举例说明。并说明如何翻译。 3、试说明名词做状语主要有哪几种情况。 4、名词、形容词用作动词的情况主要有哪些？应该如何辨认？ 二、多项选择题（在每小题的四个备选答案中，选出二个至四个正确的答案，并将其号码分别填在题干后的括号内，多选、少选、错选均无分。每小题1分，共5分） 1．下列各句中加着重号的词，属于词类活用的是（） A．斩一首者爵一级B．能富贵将军者，上也 C．曹人凶俱，为其所得者棺而出之 D．夫鼠，昼伏夜动，不穴于寝庙，畏人故也 2．下列各句中加着重号的词属于名词作状语的是（） A．裂裳衣疮，手往善药 B．其经承子厚口讲指画为文词者，悉有法度可观 C．范增数目项王D．诸侯宾至 3．下列各句含宾语前置现象的是（） A．姜氏何厌之有B．楚君之惠，末之敢忘 C．除君之恶，唯力是视D．昭王南征而不复，寡人是问 4．对下列各句中加着重号的词组分析错误的是（） A．子重使太宰伯州犁待于王后（动宾）B．将塞井夷灶而为行也（连动） C．臣之壮也犹不如人（主谓）D．以勇力之所加而治智能之官（偏正） 5．下列句子中有使动用法的是（） A．秋九月，晋侯饮赵盾酒，伏甲将攻之 B．是时万石君奋为汉王中涓，受手谒，人见平

C．见灵辄饿，问其病，曰：“不食三日矣。”食之，舍其半 D．仓廪实而知礼节，衣食足而知荣辱 四、指出并具体说明下列文句中的词类活用现象： 1．秦数败赵军，赵军固壁不战。（秦与赵兵相距长平） 2．赵王不听，遂将之。（秦与赵兵相距长平） 3．身所奉饭饮而进食者以十数，所友者以百数。（秦与赵兵相距长平） 4．括军败，数十万之众遂降秦，秦悉阬之。（秦与赵兵相距长平） 5．信数与萧何语，何奇之。（韩信拜将） 6．王必欲长王汉中，无所事信。（韩信拜将） 7．吾亦欲东耳，安能郁郁久居此乎？（韩信拜将） 8．何闻信亡，不及以闻，自追之。（韩信拜将） 9．今大王举而东，三秦可传檄而定也。（韩信拜将） 10．遇有以梦得事白上者，梦得于是改刺连州。（柳子厚墓志铭） 11．自子厚之斥，遵从而家焉，逮其死不去。（柳子厚墓志铭） 12．以如司农治事堂，栖之梁木上。（段太尉逸事状） 13．踔厉风发，率常屈其座人。（柳子厚墓志铭） 14．晞一营大噪，尽甲。（段太尉逸事状） 15．即自取水洗去血，裂裳衣疮，手注善药。（段太尉逸事状） 16．黄罔之地多竹，大者如椽。竹工破之，刳去其节，用代陶瓦。（黄冈竹楼记）17．晋灵公不君。厚敛以彫墙。（晋灵公不君） 18．既而与为公介，倒戟以御公徒而免之。（晋灵公不君） 19．盛服将朝，尚早，坐而假寐。（晋灵公不君） 20．晋侯饮赵盾酒，伏甲将攻之。（晋灵公不君） 五、说明下列文句中的词类活用现象，并将全文译为现代汉语：

概要设计及详细设计

概要设计 打招呼并判断用户是否使用该程序 1）获取数据确认用户使用该程序时提醒用户输入数据 判断用户输入数据的合法性并将合法数据存入数组 循环体1：控制第一个运算符 2）运算部分循环体2：控制第二个运算符 循环体3：控制第三个运算符 比较运算部分的结果与24：采用3个循环结构 3）输出结果打印出第一个可能的结果，终止程序 输出 没有结果时输出提示信息，终止程序 详细设计 先来分析输入部分的设计原理，作为程序的设计者，和用户的沟通是很重要的。所以开头设计了一个打招呼函数，在该函数中向用户说明程序的功能并征求用户是否开始该程序。这样的设计思路更加人性化。不仅如此，在输入数据时，设计一个循环结构，用来检测用户输入的数据是否合法，如果超出取值范围会提醒用户重新输入。这样就能够比较顺利地完成数据的获取任务。 基于穷举和简化算法结构两个出发点，该程序主体采用的是循环结构。 首先，考虑到四个数之间只能有三个运算符，每种运算符都有四种可能（加、减、乘、

除）。所以总共有4*4*4种可能的组合方式（暂不考虑家括号下的运算顺序），所以我设计了三重循环。分别以i，j，k作为计数变量，先固定i、j保持不变，k从0变到3，分别表示按照加、减、乘、除的方式依次循环，然后再让i保持不变，让k由0变到1，再将k循环从0到3循环一次，以此往复就可以把运算符所有可能的组合穷尽。 当然这是算法实现的基本过程，而在将运算方式（加、减、乘、除）与计数变量联系起来的桥梁就是函数。函数可以对两个整数进行处理，要使其根据计数变量的不同进行不同的类型的运算，就叫引入一个新的变量，在执行函数功能时让它作为开关（在该程序中，0代表加，1代表减，2代表乘，3代表除）就可以了。 最后一部分即输出部分给出了运算结果，先采用循环结构比较结果值与24是否相等（由于计算机本身精度的原因，其实只要当结果和24的差值足够小时就可以确定这种可能是可以得出24的），如果判断成立，马上输出结果并停止进一步的循环检测（减少运算量，提高效率）；如果没有可能，就输出“NO SOLUTION!”提醒用户所输入的四个数无法组合形成24。在这一步就会发掘出运算部分的四维数组的优势，中括号中的数字组合刚好对应一定的运算方式，在打印过程中就有章可循了。 总的设计思路还是按照解决问题的一般逻辑问题进行的，其中不乏很多以前没有实践过的思路和方法，而且也会涉及到一些其他方面的知识，比如电脑本身的数据结构、精度等等。所以一个完整的程序需要合乎逻辑的算法，以及多方面的考虑和技术的支持。

算法设计与分析学习总结

算法分析与设计 学习总结 题目:算法分析与设计学习总结 学院信息科学与工程学院专业2013级计算机应用技术 届次 学生姓名 学号2０１31１0６57 二○一三年一月十五日

算法分析与设计学习总结 本学期通过学习算法分析与设计课程，了解到:算法是一系列解决问题的清晰指令,代表着用系统的方法描述解决问题的策略机制。算法能够对一定规范的输入,在有限时间内获得所要求的输出。如果一个算法有缺陷，或不适合某个问题,执行这个算法将不会解决这个问题。不同的算法可能用不同的时间、空间或效率来完成同样的任务。一个算法的优劣可以用空间复杂性和时间复杂度来衡量。算法可以使用自然语言、伪代码、流程图等多种不同的方法来描述。计算机系统中的操作系统、语言编译系统、数据库管理系统以及各种各样的计算机应用系统中的软件，都必须使用具体的算法来实现。算法设计与分析是计算机科学与技术的一个核心问题。 设计的算法要具有以下的特征才能有效的完成设计要求，算法的特征有：（1）有穷性。算法在执行有限步后必须终止。(2)确定性。算法的每一个步骤必须有确切的定义。(3)输入。一个算法有0个或多个输入,作为算法开始执行前的初始值，或初始状态。(4）输出。一个算法有一个或多个输出，以反映对输入数据加工后的结果。没有输出的算法是毫无意义的。 (5)可行性。在有限时间内完成计算过程。 算法设计的整个过程,可以包含对问题需求的说明、数学模型的拟制、算法的详细设计、算法的正确性验证、算法的实现、算法分析、程序测试和文档资料的编制。算法可大致分为基本算法、数据结构的算法、数论与代数算法、计算几何的算法、图论的算法、动态规划以及数值分析、加密算法、排序算法、检索算法和并行算法。 经典的算法主要有: 1、穷举搜索法 穷举搜索法是对可能是解的众多候选解按某种顺序进行逐一枚举和检验，bing从中找出那些符合要求的候选解作为问题的解。 穷举算法特点是算法简单，但运行时所花费的时间量大。有些问题所列举书来的情况数目会大得惊人，就是用高速计算机运行,其等待运行结果的时间也将使人无法忍受。我们在用穷举算法解决问题是，应尽可能将明显不符合条件的情况排除在外，以尽快取得问题的解。 2、迭代算法 迭代法是数值分析中通过从一个初始估计出发寻找一系列近似解来解决问题（一般是解方程或方程组)的过程，为实现这一过程所使用的方法统称为迭代法。迭代法是用于求方程或方程组近似根的一种常用的算法设计方法。设方程为ｆ(ｘ)=0,用某种数学方法导出等价的形式x=g(x),然后按以下步骤执行： （1）选一个方程的近似根，赋给变量x0。 (2)将ｘ0的值保存于变量x1，然后计算g(x1),并将结果存于变量x0。 (3）当x0与x1的差的绝对值还小于指定的精度要求时，重复步骤（２）的计算。 若方程有根，并且用上述方法计算出来的近似根序列收敛,则按上述方法求得的x0就认为是方程的根。 3、递推算法 递推算法是利用问题本身所具有的一种递推关系求问题解的一种方法。它把问题分成若干步，找出相邻几步的关系,从而达到目的。 4、递归算法 递归算法是一种直接或间接的调用自身的算法。 能采用递归描述的算法通常有这样的特征：为求解规模为ｎ的问题，设法将它分解成规模较小的问题，然后从这些小问题的解方便地构造出大问题的解，并且这些规模较小的问题也能采用同样的分解和综合方法,分解成规模更小的问题,并从这些更小问题的解构造出规模

初中所学文言文中的五类常见词类活用现象

初中所学文言文中的五类常见词类活用现象

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词类活用例子 Company Document number：WUUT-WUUY-WBBGB-BWYTT-1982GT

文言实词词类活用 活用为一般动词 （一）名词活用为一般动词 1.两个名词连用，既不是并列关系，又不是修饰关系，便是动宾或主谓，其中一个必然活用为动词。 a .有一老父，衣褐，至良所。 b.籍吏民，封府库。 c.我有嘉宾，鼓瑟吹笙。 d.冬雷震震夏雨雪。 2.名词后紧跟代词，该名词活用为动词。 a.驴不胜怒，蹄之。 b.以其乃华山之阳名之。 c.名余曰正则兮。 3.名词放在副词后，便活用为动词。 a.日将暮，取儿槁葬。 b.太子及宾客知其事者，皆白衣冠以送之。 c.从弟子女十人所，皆衣缯单衣，立大巫后。 4.名词放在“能”“可”“足”“欲”等呢过愿动词后，便活用为动词。 a.假舟楫者，非能水也。 b.云青青兮欲雨。 c.其力尚足以入，火尚足以明。 d.子谓公冶长：“可妻也。”

5.名词带介宾结构做补语，这个名词活用为动词。 a.晋军（于）函陵，秦军（于）泛南。 b.唐浮图慧褒始舍于其址。 6.名词用“而”同动词或动宾词组连接时，活用为动词。 a.三代不同礼而王，五霸不同法而霸。 7.名词在“所”“者”结构中便活用为动词。 a.置人所罾鱼腹中。 a.是以，令吏人完客所馆。 形容词活用为一般动词 1.形容词用在“所”字之后，便活用为动词。 故俗之所贵，主之所贱；吏之所卑，法之所尊也。（认为宝贵、认为低贱、认为卑下、认为高贵）2.形容词在能愿动词后，活用为动词。 问其深，则其好游者不能穷也。（走到尽头） 3.形容词在“之”“我”能代词前，活用为动词。 稍出近之。（靠近） 4.形容词后带介宾结构做补语，它活用为动词。 令尹子兰……率使上官大夫短屈原于顷襄王。 （诋毁） 数词活用做一般动词 六王毕，四海一。（统一） 名词做状语

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词类活用之名词使动用法

词类活用之名词使动用法 文言文中，有些名词带宾语之后，表示使宾语怎么样的意思。如："而欲以力臣天下之主"中的"臣"，就是名词作动词，臣服的意思。（使天下之主臣服。） 1、先破秦入咸阳者王之王：让……称王 2、汗牛充栋汗：使……出汗 3、齐威王欲将孙膑将：任命……为将 词类活用之名词意动用法 在文言文中，有些名词带上宾语后，表示主语把宾语当作是什么。如："其闻道也固先乎吾，吾从而师之"中的"师"，就是"以……为老师"的意思。 1、稍稍宾客其父宾客：把……当作宾客。 2、鱼肉百姓鱼肉：以……为鱼肉 3、孟尝君客我客：把……当作门客 4、故人不独亲其亲，不独子其子。"不仅仅把亲人当作亲人，不仅仅把孩子当作孩子。" 词类活用之动词用作名词 文言文中，动词往往用作句子的主语或宾语，有时又受"其""之"等词语修饰限制，这使之具有了名词的特点。如："追亡逐北，流血漂橹"中的"亡""北"均为动词用作名词，意思是败逃的人。 1、殚其地之出，竭其庐之入出、入：产品、收入 2、去国怀乡，忧谗畏讥谗、讥：诬陷、嘲讽的话 词类活用之动词使动用法 文言文中，有些动词所表示的动作，其发出者是后面的宾语所表示的人或物，这就是动词的使动用法。如："项伯杀人，臣活之"中的"活"，就是使……活命的意思。 1、外连横而斗诸侯斗：让……争斗 2、中军置酒饮归客饮：使……饮酒 3、生死而肉骨生：使……复生

4、惊天动地惊：使……惊奇；动：使……感动 5、可烧而走也走：使……逃走 词类活用之形容词作名词 文言文中，当形容词担任主语或宾语时，它已不再表示事物的性质或特征，而是表示具有某种性质或特征的人或事物。如："将军身披坚执锐"中的"坚""锐"，指的是"坚固的铠甲和锐利的兵器"。 1、晓看红湿处红：红花 2、知否，知否，应是绿肥红瘦绿、红：绿叶、红花。 3、常在于险远。险远：危险而又道远的地方 词类活用之形容词用作动词 在文言文中，当形容词直接带宾语时，它不再表示事物性质，而是表示相应的动作行为或变化发展。如："其好游者不能穷也"中的"穷"，是走到尽头的意思。 1、欲穷千里目，更上一层楼穷：看尽 2、吾妻之美我者，私我也。私：偏爱 词类活用之形容词使动用法 在文言文中，当形容词带宾语时，它表示附加某种特征于宾语所表示的事物上，这种活用方式，就是形容词使动用法。如："春风又绿江南岸，明月何时照我还"中的"绿"，就是"使……变绿"的意思。 1、诸侯恐惧，会盟而谋弱秦弱：使……削弱 2、富国强兵富、强：使┉┉富、强 3、苦其心志，劳其筋骨，饿其体肤苦、劳、饿：使┉┉苦、劳、饿 词类活用之形容词意动用法 在文言文中，当形容词带上宾语时，它表示主语所表示的人或物认为宾语所表示的人或物具有某种性质或特征。如："登泰山而小天下"中的"小"，就是"认为……小"的意思。 1、孔子登东山而小鲁小：认为……小