The nature of the firm
The nature of the firm
R. H. Coase
过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。然而，这种考察不仅对于防止因对有关理论赖以成立的假设缺乏了解而出现的误解和不必要的争论是必不可少的，而且对于经济学在一系列不同假设的选择中作出正确的判断也是极为重要的。例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而不是从产业开始分析的倾向性，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处棗假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。罗宾逊夫人曾说过：“对于经济学中的一系列假设，需要提出的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现实世界相吻合吗？”尽管正如罗宾逊夫人所指出的，“较通常的是，一种假设是可处理的，而另一种则是现实的，”可能还有这样的理论分支，其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。下文将表明，一种不仅是现实的（即能与现实世界中的企业含义相吻合），而且是易于处理的（即能用马歇尔所发展起来的两种最强有力的经济分析工具来处理），企业的定义是可以获得的。这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念，当然，我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。
1
在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适的。让我们来考察一下阿瑟·索尔特爵土对经济体制的描述。“正常的经济体制自行运行。它的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央的监查。就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏的。”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一个有机体而不是一个组织。经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。人们都在不同方案之间进行着预测和选择。假如要使经济体制有秩序的话，这就是不可或缺的。但这种理论假定资源的流动方向直接依赖于价格机制。确实，仅仅试图去做已由价格机制做完的事常常被认为是反对经济计划工作的一个理由。然而，阿瑟·索尔特爵士的描述却给出了一个有关我们经济体制的非常不完整的画面。在企业中，这种描述根本不适用。例如，我们发现在经济理论中生产要素在各种不同的用途之间的配置是由价格机制决定的。如果要素 A 的价格在X比在Y高，则A就会从Y流向X，直到X和Y之间的价格差消失为止，除非存在着某种程度上的其他方面的利益补偿。然而，在现实世界中，我们发现这种说法在许多地方并不适用。如果一个工人从部门Y流向部门X，他这样做并不是因为相对价格的变化，而是因为他被命令这样做。那些反对经济计划工作的人的理由是，问题已被价格机制解决了。对于这种观点，应该指出，我们的经济体制中存在的计划完全不同于上面所提到的私人计划，而类似于通常所说的经济计划。上面这个例子在我们的现代经济体制中具有大范围的典型意义。当然，经济学家们并没有忽视
这一事实。马歇尔把组织作为第四种生产要素引入经济学理论；J.B.克拉克赋予企业家以统筹职能；奈特教授强调了经理的协调作用。正如D.H.罗伯逊所指出的，我们发现了“在不自觉的统筹协调的大海中的自觉力量的小岛，它如同凝结在一桶黄油牛奶中的一块块黄油。”但既然人们通常认为统筹协调能通过价格机制来实现，那么，为什么这样的组织是必需的呢？为什么会存在“自觉力量的小岛”呢？在企业之外，价格变动决定生产，这是通过一系列市场交易来协调的。在企业之内，市场交易被取消，伴随着交易的复杂的市场结构被企业家所替代，企业家指挥生产。显然，存在着协调生产的替代方法。然而，假如生产是由价格机制调节的，生产就能在根本不存在任何组织的情况下进行，面对这一事实，我们要问：组织为什么存在？
当然，价格机制能被替代的程度有很大差异。在一个百货商店中，各种柜台在大棱里的空间配置既可以由管理当局决定，也可以是为场地进行竞争性价格招标的结果。在兰开夏的棉纺织业中，一个纺织商能靠信用租到动力设备和店铺，获得织机和棉纱。然而，这一系列生产要素的组织协调通常是在没有价格机制参与的情况下进行的。显然，作为替代价格机制的“纵向”一体化的程度在不同产业和不同企业间差别悬殊。
我认为，可以假定企业的显著特征就是作为价格机制的替代物。当然，正如罗宾斯教授所指出的：“（企业）与外部的相对价格和相对成本的网络有关，”可重要的是发现这种关系的真正性质。莫里斯·多布先生生动地描述了资源配置在企业中和在经济体系中的区别。他在讨论亚当·斯密的资本家概念时写道：“人们开始看到存在着比承包商主持的每一个工厂或单位的内部关系更加重要的事情；承包商与在他的直接活动空间之外的经济世界存在着联系……承包商亲自忙于每一个企业内部的劳动分工，并且他自觉地进行着计划和组织，”但是“他是与更大规模的经济专业化相联系的，在那里他自己不过是一个专业化的单位。可见，他在一个大规模的有机体中发挥着他作为一个单个细胞的作用，他几乎是不自觉地担任着一个重要角色。
就事实而言，虽然经济学家们将价格机制作为一种协调工具，可他们也承认了“企业家”的协调功能，研究为什么协调在某一情况下是价格机制的工作，而在另一种情况下又是企业家的工作是极为重要的。本文的目的就是要在经济理论的一个鸿沟上架起一座桥梁，这个鸿沟出现在这样两个假设之间：一个假设（为了某些目的作出的）是，资源的配置由价格机制决定；另一个假设（为了其他一些目的作出的）是，资源的配置依赖于作为协调者的企业家。我们必须说明在实践中影响在这两者之间进行选择的基础。
2
我们的任务是试图发现企业在一个专业化的交换经济中出现的根本原因。价格机制（单纯从资源导向的方面考虑）可以被替代，假如替代价格机制的关系正是其自身所期望的话。
例如，如果一些人愿意在其他一些人的指挥下工作，这一情形就会出现。这些个人为了能在某个人手下工作会接受低报酬，企业便由此自然而然地出现了，但这不能成为企业出现的一个非常重要的现由，似乎更确切他说，还有一种相对立的倾向在起作用，如人们通常趋向于寻求“成为自己的主人”的好处自然，如果这种愿
望不是被人控制，而是控制别人和指挥别人，那么，人们为了能指挥别人可能会愿意放弃某些东西，那就是，他们将愿意支付给别人多于这些人在价格机制下所能得到的报酬，目的是为了能指挥这些人。但这意味着他们是为了能指挥别人而付钱，而不是以指挥别人而赚钱，在大多数情形下这显然是不真实的。如果购买者较之于以其他方式生产的商品更偏爱由企业生产的商品，企业也可能存在；可是，即使在这种偏好（假如它们存在的话）的重要性可以忽略不计的范畴内，在现实世界中企业仍然存在。因此，必定存在其他相关的因素。
建立企业有利可图的主要原因似乎是，利用价格机制是有成本的。通过价格机制“组织”生产的最明显的成本就是所有发现相对价格的工和。随着出卖这类信息的专门人员的出现，这种成本有可能减少，但不可能消除。市场上发生的每一笔交易的谈判和签约的费用也必须考虑在内。再者，在某些市场中（如农产品交易）可以设计出一种技术使契约的成本最小化，但不可能消除这种成本。确实，当存在企业时，契约不会被取消，但却大大减少了。某一生产要素（或它的所有者）不必与企业内部同他合作的一些生产要素签订一系列的契约。当然，如果这种合作是价格机制起作用的一个直接结果，一系列的契约就是必需的。一系列的契约被一个契约替代了。在此阶段，重要的是注意契约的特性，即注意企业中被雇佣的生产要素是如何进入的。通过契约，生产要素为获得一定的报酬（它可以是固定的也可以是浮动的）同意在一定限度内服从企业家的指挥。契约的本质在于它限定了企业家的权力范围。只有在限定的范围内，他才能指挥其他生产要素。
然而，利用价格机制也存在着其他方面的不利因素（或成本）。为某种物品或劳务的供给签订长期的契约可能是期望的。这可能缘于这样的事实：如果签订一个较长期的契约以替代若干个较短期的契约，那么，签订每一个契约的部分费用就将被节省下来。或者，由于人们注重避免风险，他们可能宁愿签订长期契约而不是短期契约。现在的问题是，由于预测方面的困难，有关物品或劳务供给的契约期越长，实现的可能性就越小，从而买方也越不愿意明确规定出要求缔约对方干些什么。对于供给者来说，通过几种方式中的哪一种来进行物品或劳务的供给，井没有多大差异，可对于物品或劳务的购买者来说就不是如此。但由于购买者不知道供给者的几种方式中哪一种是他所需要的，因此，将来要提供的劳务只是以一般条款规定一下，而具体细节则留待以后解决。契约中的所有陈述是要求供给者供给物品或劳务的范围，而要求供给者所做的细节在契约中没有阐述，是以后由购买者决定的。当资源的流向（在契约规定的范围内）变得以这种方式依赖于买方时，我称之为“企业” 的那种关系就流行起来了。因此，企业或许就是在期限很短的契约不令人满意的情形下出现的。购买劳务棗劳动棗的情形显然比购买物品的情形具有更为重要的意义。在购买物品时，主要项目能够预先说明而其中细节则以后再决定的意义并不大。我们可以将这一节的讨论总结一下。市场的运行是有成本的，通过形成一个组织，并允许某个权威（一个“企业家”）来支配资源，就能节约某些市场运行成本。企业家不得不在低成本状态下行使他的职能，这是鉴于如下的事实：他可以以低于他所替代的市场交易的价格得到生产要素，因为如果他做不到这一点，通常也能够再回到公开市场。不确定性问题常常被认为是与对企业均衡的研究密切相关的。如果没有不确定性，企业的出现似乎是不可思议的。但是，那些认为支付方式是企业的特征的人（如奈特教授）棗一个接受剩余的和浮动的收入的人保证那些参加生产的人
有固定的收入棗似乎提出一个与我们所考虑的问题无关的观点。一个企业家可以将他的劳务出售给另一个企业家以获得一定的货币收入，而他支付给雇员的钱则主要或完全是其利润的一部分。重要的问题看来是，资源的配置为什么没有直接通过价格机制来完成。
另一个应该注意的因素是，有管制力量的政府或其他机构常常对市场交易和在企业内部组织同样的交易区别对待。如果我们考察一下销售税的课征就会看到，显然，它是一种有关市场交易而不是在企业内部组织的同样交易的税收。既然现在有两种不同的可供选择的“组织”方法棗通过价格机制或通过企业家，那么这样的政府管制便会导致企业的存在，不然企业的存在就没有任何理由和目的。这为在一个专业化的交换经济中企业的出现提供了一个理由。当然，对于企业已经存在的情形而言，诸如销售税这样的措施只不过会使企业变得比原来更大。同样，意味着定量配给的配额和价格控制的办法对于那些为自己生产产品的企业是没有作用的，这等于给那些在企业内部组织生产而不通过市场的企业以好处，必然鼓励企业规模的扩大。但是，上述这些作为监督、管理的措施会导致企业的出现，这一点是令人难以置信的。然而，如果企业的存在没有其他理由，那么这些措施会产生这样的结果。
因此，以上这些就是在一个通常被假定由价格机制“组织”资源分配的专业化交换经济中，诸如企业这类组织存在的原因。所以，当资源的导向依赖于企业家时，由一些关系系统构成的企业就开始出现了。
这种初具轮廓的观念看来会有助于对企业规模扩大或缩小的含义作出科学的解释。当追加的交易（它可以是通过价格机制协调的交易）由企业家来组织时，企业就变大；当企业家放弃对这些交易的组织时，企业就变小。由此产生的问题是，研究决定企业规模的力量是否有可能。为什么企业家不少组织点或多组织点交易呢？注意一下奈特教授的观点是有意义的：
“效率与规模之间的关系是最严肃的理论问题之一，从本质上讲，就一个工厂的效率与规模之间的关系而言，其在相当程度上与其说是取决于智力的一般原理，不如说是取决于个人人格和历史机遇。但这个问题是至关重要的，因为垄断收益的可能性对企业不断的和无限的扩张提供了强有力的激励，而这种力量必然被随着企业规模的增大而使效率下降（在货币收入的生产中）的一些同样强有力的力量所抵销，所有这些即使在有限竞争时也存在。”
奈特教授似乎认为科学地分析企业规模的决定是不可能的。现在，我们将在上述企业概念的基础上，试图完成这个任务。
前已论及，企业的引入基本上是由于市场运行成本的存在。一个与此相关问题是（远非奈特教授所提出的垄断问题），既然通过组织能消除一定的成本，而且事实上减少了生产成本，那么为什么市场交易仍然存在呢？为什么所在生产不由一个大企业去进行呢？对这一向题，看来确有某种可能的解释。
首先，当企业扩大时，对企业家的功能来说，收益可能会减少，也就是说，在企业内部组织追加交易的成本可能会上升。自然，企业的扩大必须达到这一点，即在企业内部组织一笔额外交易的成本等于在公开市场上完成这笔交易所需的成本，或者等于由另一个企业家来组织这笔交易的成本。其次，当组织的交易增加时，或许企业家不能成功地将生产要素用在它们价值最大的地方，也就是说，不能导致生产要素的最佳使用。再者，交易增加必须达到这一点，即资源浪费带来的亏损等于
在公开市场上进行交易的成本，或者等于由另一个企业家组织这笔交易的亏损。最后，一种或多种生产要素的供给价格可能会上升，因为小企业的“其他优势”大于大企业。当然，企业扩张的实际停止点可能由上述各因素共同决定。前两个原因最有可能对应于经济学家们的“管理收益递减“的论点。
上文已经指出这样一点：企业将倾向于扩张直到在企业内部组织一笔额外交易的成本，等于通过在公开市场上完成同一笔交易的成本或在另一个企业中组织同样交易的成本为止。但如果企业在低于公开市场上的交易成本这一点上或在等于在另一个企业中组织同样交易的成本这一点上停止其扩张，在大多数情况下（“联合” 的情况除外），这将意味着在这两个生产者之间存在着市场交易，其中每一方都能在低于实际市场运行成本的水平上组织生产。如何解决这个悖论呢？为了便于说明，我们来举一个例子。假定A向B购买产品，且A和B都能在低于其现在成本的条件下组织市场交易。我们可以假定，B不是组织生产的一个过程或阶段，而是组织许多个。假如A由此希望避免市场交易，那他将不得不接管所有由B控制的生产过程。除非A接管了所有生产过程，否则市场交易将依然存在，尽管市场上交易的是不同的产品。但我们前面已经假定，每一个生产者的扩张会导致效率降低；组织一笔额外交易的附加成本会上升。A组织先前由B组织的交易的成本可能会大于B 做这件事的成本。只有当A组织B的工作的成本不大于B的成本且数量上等于公开市场上完成同样交易的成本时，A才会由此接管B的所有组织。可一旦市场交易变得经济时，以这样的方式将生产分开也要付出代价，即在每一个企业中组织一笔额外交易的成本是一样的。
直到现在我们一直假定通过价格机制发生的市场交易是同质的。事实上，没有一件事能够比我们现代社会中发生的实际交易更多样化了。这似乎意味着通过价格机制完成交易的成本是彼此差异很大的，而在企业内部组织交易的成本亦如此。因此，即使撇开收益递减问题，在企业内部组织某些交易的成本似乎也有可能大于在公开市场上完成交易的成本。这必然意味着通过价格机制完成的交易是存在的，但这意味着必须存在一个以上的企业吗？显然不是，因为在经济体制中，凡是资源导向不直接依赖于价格机制的所有领域，都能被组织到一个企业中去。本文早先讨论的因素看来很重要，尽管难以断言“管理收益递减”或要素供给价格上升是否看起来更为重要。所以，当其他条件相同时，企业在如下情况下将趋于扩大： 1. 组织成本愈少，随着被组织的交易的增多，成本上升得愈慢。 2. 企业家犯错误的可能性愈小，随着被组织的交易的增多，失误增加得愈少。3. 企业规模愈大，生产要素的供给价格下降得愈大（或上升得愈小）。
对不同规模的企业而言，除了生产要素的供给价格千差万别外，随着被组织的交易的空间分布、交易的差异性和相对价格变化的可能性的增加，组织成本和失误带来的亏损似乎也会增加。当更多的交易由一个企业家来组织时，交易似乎将倾向于既有不同的种类也有不同的位置。这为企业扩大时效率将趋于下降提供了一个附加原因。倾向于使生产要素结合得更紧和分布空间更小的创新，将导致企业规模的扩大。倾向于降低空间组织成本的电话和电报的技术变革将导致企业规模的扩大。一切有助于提高管理技术的变革都将导致企业规模的扩大。
应该注意到，上面给出的企业的定义能被用于对“联合”和“一体化”作出精确的解释。当先前由两个或更多个企业家组织的交易变成由一个企业家组织时，便
出现了联合。当所涉及的先前由企业家之间在市场上完成的交易被组织起来时，这便是一体化。企业能以这两种方式中的一种或同时以这两种方式进行扩张。整个“竞争性产业的结构”便能用通常的经济分析方法来处理了。
3
前一节中所考察的问题井没有被经济学家们所完全忽视。现在需要考虑的是，为什么上述关于企业在专业化交换经济中出现的原因比其他已有的解释更可取。有人说，企业存在的原因可以从劳动分工中发现。这是厄舍教授的观点，这一观点已被莫里斯·多布先生接受和扩展。企业是“劳动分工日益复杂的结果……经济分工程度的增长需要一定的一体化力量，没有一体化力量，分工将导致混乱；而且正是因为在分工经济中存在一体化力量，产业形式才富有意义。”这一答案的结论是明显的。“分工经济中的一体化力量”已经以价格机制的形式存在了。经济科学的主要功绩或许是它已表明没有理由认为专业化必然导致混乱。莫里斯，多布先生给出的原因因此是站不佳脚的。必须说明的是，为什么一种一体化力量（企业家）会替代另一种一体化力量（价格机制）。在奈特教授的《风险、不确定性和利润》一书中可以找到已有的说明这一事实的最有意思的（也可能是最广为接受的）理由。他的观点将详细说明如下。奈特教授从不存在不确定性的体制开始说明：“个体在绝对自由而没有合谋人的情形下的行动，应该是通过劳动的一级和二级分工及资本的使用等来组织经济生活，这在今天的美国已发展到广为人知的程度。能唤起人们想象力的基本事实是生产团体和行政机构的内部组织。当不确定性完全不存在时，每个个人都能够掌握有关势态的全部知识，任何责任管理的性质和对生产活动的控制就都没有必要了。甚至任何现实意义上的市场交易也将不复存在。未经加工的原材料和生产服务流向消费者将完全是自动的。”
奈特教授说，我们可以想象这种协调是“单靠试错法发挥作用的长期实践过程的结果，”没有必要“去想象每个工人处于与他人的工作有关的‘事先建立起的和谐’ 气氛中在恰当的时间里准确无误地做着恰当的工作。那里或许有旨在协调个人活动的管理者和监督者等”这些管理者仅承担单纯的日常职能，“没有任何性质的责任。”
奈特教授接着说：“把不确定性棗无知的事实和只靠判断而不靠知识进行行动的必要性棗导入伊甸园式的情形中，其特征会完全改观……伴随着不确定性的存在而行事，行动的实际执行在现实意义上变成生活的次要部分了，而首要的问题和职能是决定做什么和怎样去做。”
不确定性的事实带来了有关社会组织的两个最重要的特征。
“第一，物品是为市场而生产的，其基础是完全非个人的需求预测，而不是为满足生产者自己的需要。生产者承担了预测消费者需求的责任。第二，预测工作和与此同时的对生产的技术指导和控制的大部分会进一步集中在一小部分生产者那里，由此出现了新的经济工作人员棗企业家。……当存在不确定性时，决定做什么和怎么做的任务相对于其实施处于支配地位，生产团体的内部组织不再是无关紧要的事情和机械性的细节。决策和控制功能的集中化是亟需的，一个‘头领化’的过程不可避免。”
最根本的变化是：“在这种体制下，自信者和冒险家承担风险或保证动摇者和胆小鬼获得一定的收入，以此作为对实际结果进行分配的交换……出于人类的天
性，我们知道，一个人保证另一个人行动的特定结果而没有赋予其支配他人工作的权力是不现实的和非常罕见的。另一方面，没有这样的保证，后者不会将自己置于前者的指挥之下……功能的多层次专业化的结果是企业和产业的工资制度，它在世界上的存在是不确定性这一事实的直接结果。”
这些引语表明了奈特教授的理论的实质。不确定性的存在意味着人们不得不预测未来的需要。因此出现了一个特殊阶层，他们向他人支付有保证的工资，并以此控制他人的行动。因为良好的判断力通常与一个人对其判断力的自信心相联系，所以这个特殊阶层起着作用。
奈特教授似乎给自己留下了几个需要商榷的题目。首先，正如他自己指出的，某些人具有较好的判断力和知识这一事实并不意味着他们只能从亲自参加生产中获得收入。他们可以出卖建议和知识。每－个企业都买下了一大帮顾问的劳务。我们可以想象－个所有的建议和知识都是按需购买的体制。其次，通过与正在进行生产的人缔结契约而不是主动地参加生产也能以较好的知识和判断力获得报酬。商人购买期货即为一例。但这只不过说明，给予完成的某些行为以报酬保证而没有去指挥这些行为的完成，是完全可能的。奈特教授说“基于人类的天性，我们知道，一个人保证另一个人行动的特定结果而没有赋予其支配他人工作的权力是不现实的和非常罕见的，”这显然是不正确的。大部分工作是根据契约去做的，就是说，契约保证给缔约人的某些行为以一定的收益。但这并没包含任何支配。然而，这确实意味着相对价格制度发生了变化，并将出现生产要紊的重新安排。奈特教授提到的“没有这样的保证，后者不会将自己置于前者的指挥之下”这一事实与我们正在考察的问题无关。最后，值得注意的是，奈特教授认为“即使在不存在不确定性的经济体制中，仍存在协调者，尽管他们仅承担日常工作的职能。奈特教授迅速补充说他们将“没有任何性质的责任”，于是问题出现了：谁给他们报酬？，为什么？奈特教授似乎从末说明价格机制被替代的原因。
4
进一步说明这一点看来是重要的，那就是上述讨论与“企比成本曲线”的一般问题的相关性。人们有时假定，如果企业的成本曲线向上倾斜，在完全竞争条件下，企业在规模上会受到限制；而在不完全竞争条件下，企业在规模上受到限制是因为当边际成本等于边际收益时，企业不愿意付出大于产出的生产代价。但显然企业可以生产一种以上的产品，所以，没有显而易见的原因说明为什么在完全竞争的情况下成本曲线向上倾斜和在不完全竞争的情况下，边际成本通常不低于边际收益的事实会限制企业的规模。罗宾逊夫人作出了仅生产一种产品的简单假定，但研究企业生产的产品种数是如何决定的，显然是重要的，同时，没有一种假定实际上只生产一种产品的理论会有非常大的实际意义。
有人或许会说，在完全竞争条件下，既然生产的每一种产品都能按照通行的价格出售，那么就没必要生产任何其他产品了。但这一说法忽视了这样的事实，那就是可能存在这一情况：组织一种新产品的交易较之继续组织老产品的交易成本要低。这一点可以用下面的方法加以说明。根据冯·屠能的思路，设想有一个小镇，是消费中心，还有一些产业分布在这个中心的周围。这些情况可用下图说明，其中A，B，C表示不同的产业。设想一个企业家从X开始控制交易。现在，当他在同一种产品（B）上扩大其生产经营活动时，组织成本会增加，直到它等于邻近的其他产品的
组织成本为止。随着企业的扩张，企业生产由此将从一种产品发展到多种产品（A 和C）。这样处理问题显然是不全面的，但对于表明仅仅论证成本曲线倾向于向上不能得出企业规模会受到限制的结论，则是必要的。至此，我们只考察了完全竞争的情况，而不完全竞争的情况似乎是显而易见的。
为了确定企业的规模，我们不得不考虑市场成本（即使用价格机制的成本）和不同企业家的组织成本，而后我们才能确定每一个企业生产多少种产品和每一种产品生产多少。因此，肖夫先生在他的关于“不完全竞争”的论义中显然提出了罗宾逊夫人的成本曲线理论所不能回答的问题。上面提到的因素似乎是与此相关的。
5
现在唯一剩下的问题是，看一看已经发展起来的企业概念是不是与现实世界中的情况相一致。通过考虑通常被称为“主人与仆人”或“雇主与雇员”的法律关系，我们能很好地研究现实中企业的构成问题。这种关系的实质列举如下：“（1）仆人必须向主人或主人的其他代理人承担提供个人劳务的义务，而契约就是有关物品或类似物品的出售的契约。
（2）主人必须有权亲自或者通过另一个仆人或代理人控制仆人的工作。有权告诉仆人何时工作（在服务时间内）和何时不工作，以及做什么工作和如何去做（在服务范围内），这种控制和干预的权利就是这种关系的本质特征，它从独立的缔约人或从仅向其雇主提供其劳动成果的雇员中区分出了仆人。在后一种情形中，缔约人或执行人不是在雇主的控制下做工作和提供劳务，而是他必须计划和设法完成他的工作，以便实现他答应提供的结果。”
由此可见，指挥是“雇主与雇员”这种法律关系的实质，这正是上文所提出的经济概念。巴特教授的话是值得注意的
“代理人与仆人的区别并不是存在或不存在固定工资或由企业专门委员会决定的报酬，而是代理人有就业的自由。”
由此我们可以得出结论，我们给出的定义与现实世界中的企业是非常接近的。因此，我们的定义是现实的。那么，我们的定义能应用吗？答案显然是肯定的。当我们考虑企业应多大时，边际原理就会顺利地发挥作用。这个问题始终是，在组织权威下增加额外交易要付出代价吗？在边际点上，在企业内部组织交易的成本或是等于在另一个企业中的组织成本，或是等于由价格机制“组织”这笔交易所包含的成本。实业家们不断地进行实验，多控制一点或少控制一点交易，用这个办法来维持均衡。这就为静态分析提供了均衡状态。但显然，动态因素也是相当重要的。一般只有对引起企业内部组织成本和市场成本的变化作了调查，才能说明企业规模为什么扩大或缩小。我们因此有了滚动均衡理论。上面的分析也似乎澄清了经营和管理之间的关系。经营意味着预测和通过签订新的契约、利用价格机制进行操作。管理则恰恰意味着仅仅对价格变化作出反应，并在其控制下重新安排生产要素。实业家们通常具有这两种功能是上面所讨论的市场成本的明显结果。最后，这样的分析就使我们更准确地叙述企业家的“边际产品”的含义。但对这一点的详细描述会使我们远远超出相形之下较为简单的定义和分类的任务。
英文校对版：
The nature of the firm
By R. H. Coase
Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumptions . Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundation on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent the misunderstanding and needless controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgment in choosing between rival sets of assumptions.
For instance, it is suggested that the use of the word "firm” in economics may be different from the use of the term by the "plain ma n”. Since there is apparently a trend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry , it is all the more necessary not only that a clear definition of the word "firm" should be given but that its difference from a firm in the " real world," if it exist，should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson has said that "the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable? And: Do they correspond with the real world? “. Though, as Mrs. Robinson points out, “more often one set will be manageable and the other realistic”， yet there may well be branches of theory where assumptions may he both manageable and realistic.
It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin . Our definition must, of course, "relate to formal relations which are capable of being conceived exactly."
Ⅰ
It is convenient if, in searching for a definition of a firm, we first consider the economic system as it is normally treated by the economists. Let us consider the description of the economic system given by Sir Arthur Salter. "The normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive." An economist thinks of the economic system as being coordinated by the price mechanism and society becomes not an organization but an organism. The economic system "works itself." This does not mean that there is no planning by individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the system. But this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price mechanism.
Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism. Sir Arthur Salter's description, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system . Within a firm， the description does not fit at all.
For instance, in economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of production between different Uses is determined by the price mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result，A moves from Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and Y , except in so far as it compensates for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world , we find that there are many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to department X , he does not go because of a change In relative prices，but because he is ordered to do so. Those who object to economic planning on the grounds that the problem is solved by price movements can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within our economic system which is quite different from the individual planning mentioned above and which is akin to what is normally called economic planning.
The example given above is typical of a large sphere in our modern economic System. Of course, this fact has not been ignored by economists. Marshall introduce organization as a fourth factor of production; J B. Clark give the co-ordinating function to the entrepreneur; Professor Knight introduces managers who co-ordinate. As. D. H. Robertson points out, we find islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of butter milk." But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination will be done by the price mechanism，why is such organization necessary ? Why are there the "islands of conscious power"?
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is
co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, the market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator ，who directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordination production. Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?
Of course, the degree to which the price mechanism is superseded varies greatly. In a department store, the allocation of the different sections to the various locations in the building may be done by the controlling authority or it may be the result of competitive price bidding for space. In the Lancashire cotton industry, a weaver can rent power and shop-room and can
obtain looms and yarn on credit. This co-ordination of the various factors of production is, however，normally carried out without the intervention of the price mechanism. As is evident， the amount of "vertical" integration, involving as it does the supersession of the price mechanism, varies greatly from industry to industry and from firm to firm.
It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism. It is of course, as Professor Robbins points out, "related to an outside network of relative price and costs," but it is important to discover the exact nature of this relationship. T his distinction between the allocation of resources in a firm and the allocation in the economic system has been very vividly described by Mr. Maurice Dobb when discussing Adam Smith's conception of the capitalist:" it began to be seen that there was something more important than the relations inside each factory or unit captained by an undertaker; there were the relations of the undertaker with the rest of the economic world outside his immediate sphere . . . . The undertaker busies himself with the division of labor inside each firm and he plans and organizes consciously," but "he is related to the much larger economic specialization, of which he himself is merely one specialized unit. Here, he plays his part as a single cell in a larger organism, mainly unconscious of the wider role he fills.
In view of the fact that while economists treat the price mechanism as a co-ordinating instrument, they also admit the co-coordinating function of the "entrepreneur," it is surely important to enquire why co-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one case and of the entrepreneur in another. The purpose of this paper is to bridge what appears to be a gap in economic theory between the assumption (made for some purposes) that resources are allocated by means of the price mechanism and the assumption (made for other purposes) that this allocation is dependent on the entrepreneur-co-ordinator. We have to explain the basis on which in practice, this choice between alternatives is effected.
Ⅱ
Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at all in a specialized exchange economy. The price mechanism (considered purely from the side of the direction of resource) might be superseded if the relationship which replaced it was desired for its own sake. This would be the case, for example, if some people preferred to work under the direction of some other person. Such individuals would accept less in order to work under someone, and firms would arise naturally from this. But it would appear that this cannot be a very important reason , for it would rather seem that the opposite tendency is operating if one judges from the stress normally laid on the advantage of "being one's own master." Of course, if the desire was not to
be controlled but to control, to exercise power over others, then people might be willing to give up something in order to direct others; that is，they would be willing to pay others more than they could get under the price mechanism in order to be able to direct them. But this implies that those who direct pay in order to be able to do this and are not paid to direct, which is clearly not true in the majority of cases. Firms might also exist if purchasers "preferred commodities which are produced by firms to those not so produced; but even in spheres where one would expect such preferences (if they exist) to be of negligible importance, firms are to be found in the real world. Therefore t here must be other elements involved.
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of "organizing" production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are. This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into account. Again, in certain markets， e. g.，produce exchanges, a technique is devised for minimizing these contract costs; but they are not eliminated. It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be necessary， of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one. At this stage ， it is important to note the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. The essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur. Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production. There are, however, other disadvantages --or costs--of using the price mechanism. It may be desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service. This may be due to the fact that if one contract is made for a longer period, instead of several shorter ones, then certain costs of making each contract will be avoided. Or, owing to the risk attitude of the people concerned, they may prefer to make a long rather than a short-term contract. Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting，the longer the period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do. It may well be a matter
of indifference to the person supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or commodity. But the purchaser will not know which of these several courses he will want the supplier to take Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact details being left until a later date. All that is stated in the contract is the limits to what the person supplying the commodity or service is expected to do. The details of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract but is decided later by the purchaser. When the direction of resource (within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a "firm" may be obtained. A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where a very short term contract would be unsatisfactory. It is obviously of more importance in the case of services labor than it is in the case of the buying of commodities. In the case of commodities, the main items can be stated in advance and the details which will be decided later will be of minor significance.
We may sum up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some authority (an " entrepreneur ") to direct the resources， certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost , taking into account the fact that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the market transactions which he supersedes，because it is always possible to revert to the open market if he fails to do this.
The question of uncertainty is one which is often considered to be very relevant to the study of the equilibrium of the firm. It seems improbable that a firm would emerge without the existence of uncertainty. But those, for instance, Professor Knight, who make the mode of payment the distinguishing mark of the firm-fixed incomes being guaranteed to some of those engaged in production by a person who takes the residual，and fluctuating, income would appear to be introducing a point which is irrelevant to the problem we are considering. One entrepreneur may sell his services to another for a certain sum of money, while the payment to his employees may be mainly or wholly a share in profits. The significant question would appear to be, why, the allocation of resources is not done directly by the price mechanism.
Another factor that should be noted is that exchange transactions on a market and the same transaction organized within a firm are often treated differently by Governments or other bodies with regulatory powers. If we consider the operation of a sales tax, it is clear that it is a tax on market transactions and not on the same transactions organized within the firm. Now since these are alternative methods of "organization” by the price mechanism or by the entrepreneur--such a regulation would bring into existence firms
which otherwise would have no raison d'être. It would furnish a reason for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy. Of course, to the extent that firms already exist， such a measure as a sales tax would merely tend to make them larger than they would otherwise be，Similarly, quota schemes, and methods of price control which imply that there is rationing, and which do not apply to firms producing such products for themselves, by allowing advantages to those who organize within the firm and not through the market, necessarily encourage the growth of firms. But it is difficult to believe that it is measures such as have been mentioned in this paragraph which have brought firms into existence. Such measures would， however，tend to have this result if they did not exist for other reasons.
These, then, are the reasons why organizations such as firms exist in a specialized exchange economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is “organized” by the price mechanism. A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which come into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur.
The approach which has just been sketched would appear to offer an advantage in that it is possible to give a scientific meaning to what is meant by saying that a firm gets larger or smaller. A firm becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange transactions co-ordinated through the price mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he abandons the organization of such transactions. The question which arises is whether it is possible to study the forces which determine the Size of the firm. Why does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more? It is interesting to note that Professor Knight considers that:
"The relation between efficiency and size is one of the most serious problems of theory, being, in contrast with the relation for a plant, largely a matter of personality and historical accident rather than of intelligible generate principles. But the question is peculiarly vital because the possibility of monopoly gain offers a powerful incentive to continuous and unlimited expansion of the firm, which force must be offset by some equally powerful one making for decreased efficiency (in the production of money income) with growth in size, if even boundary competition is to exist."
Professor Knight would appear to consider that it is impossible to treat scientifically the determinants of the size of the firm. On the basis of the concept of the firm developed above, this task will now be attempted.
It was suggested that the introduction of the firm was due primarily to the existence of marketing costs. A pertinent question to ask would appear to be (quite apart from the monopoly considerations raised by Professor Knight), why, if by organizing one can eliminate certain costs and in fact
reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions at all?' Why is not all production carried on by one big firm? There would appear to be certain possible explanations.
First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm may rise. Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the open marker, or, to the costs of organizing by another entrepreneur. Secondly, it may be that as the transaction which are organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the use where their value is greatest, that is，fails to make the best use of the factors of production. Again, a point must be reached where the loss through the waste of resources is equal to the marketing costs of the exchange transaction in the open market or to the loss if the transaction was organized by another entrepreneur. Finally, the supply price of one or more of the factors of production may rise, because the "other advantages" of a small firm are greater than those of a large firm. Of course, the actual point where the expansion of the firm ceases might be determined by a combination of the factors mentioned above. The first two reasons given most probably correspond to the economists' phrase of "diminishing returns to management”.
The point has been made in the previous paragraph that a firm was tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm. But if the firm stops its expansion at a point below the costs of marketing in the open market and at a point equal to the costs of organizing in another firm, in most cases (excluding the case of "combination “， this will imply that there is a market transaction between these two produces, each of whom could organize it at less than the actual marketing costs. How is the paradox to be resolved? If we consider an example the reason for this will become clear. Suppose A is buying a product from B and that both A and B could organize this marketing transaction at less than its present cost. B, we can assume, is not organizing one process or stage of production, but several. If A therefore wishes to avoid a market transaction, he will have to take over all the processes of production controlled by B. Unless A takes over all the processes of production, a market transaction will still remain, although It is a different product that is bought. But we have previously assumed that as each producer expands, he becomes less efficient; the additional costs of organizing extra transactions Increase. It is probable that A's cost of organizing the transactions previously organized by B will be greater than
B's cost of doing the same thing. A therefore will take over the whole of B's organization only if his cost of organizing B's work is not greater than B's cost by an amount equal to the costs of carrying out an exchange transaction on the open market. But once It becomes economical to have a market transaction, it also pays to divide production in such a way that the cost of organizing an extra transaction in each firm is the same.
Up to now it has been assumed that the exchange transactions which take place through the price mechanism are homogeneous. In fact, nothing could be more diverse than the actual transactions which take place in our modern World. This would seem to imply that the costs of carrying out exchange transactions through the price mechanism will vary considerably as will also the costs of organizing these transactions within the firm. It seems therefore possible that quite apart from the question of diminishing returns the costs of organizing certain transactions within the firm may be greater than the costs of carrying out the exchange transactions in the open market. This would necessarily imply that there were exchange transactions carried out through the price mechanism, but would it mean that there would have to be more than one firm? Clearly not, for all those areas in the economic system where the direction of resources was not dependent directly on the price mechanism could be organized within one firm. The factors which were discussed earlier would seem to be the important ones, though it is difficult to say whether "diminishing returns to management” or the rising supply price of factors is likely to be the more Important.
Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger:
(a) The less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the transactions organized .
(b) The less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized.
(c) The greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price of factors of production to firms of larger Size.
Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to firms of different sizes, it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transaction, and in the probability of changes in the relevant prices. As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur， it would appear that the transactions Would tend to be either different in kind or in different places. This furnished an additional reason why e efficiency will tend to decrease as the firm gets larger. Inventions which tend to bring factors of production nearer together, by lessening spatial distribution, tend to increase the size of the firm. Changes like the telephone and the telegraph
which tend to reduce the cost of organizing spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.
It should be noted that the definition of a firm which was given above can be used to give more precise meanings to the terms "combination" and "integration." There is a combination when transactions which were previously organized by two or more entrepreneurs become organized by one. These become integration when it envolves the organization of transactions which previously carried out between the entrepreneurs on the market. A firm can expand in either or both of these two ways. The whole of the “structure of competitive industry” becomes tractable by the ordinary technique of economical analysis.
Ⅲ
The problem which has been investigated in the previous section has not been entirely neglected by economists and it is now necessary to consider why the reasons given above for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy are to be preferred to the other explanations which have been offered.
It is sometimes said that the reason for the existence of a firm is to be found in the division of labor. This is the view of Professor Usher, a view which has been adopted and expanded by Mr. Maurice Dobb. The firm becomes "the result of an increasing complexity of the division of labor . . . . The growth of this economic differentiation creates the need for some integrating force without which differentiation would collapse into chaos; and it is as the integrating force in a differentiated economy that industrial forms are chiefly significant. “The answer to this argument is an obvious one. The" integrating force in a differentiated economy” already exists in the form of the price mechanism. It is perhaps the main achievement of economic science that it has shown that there is no reason to suppose that specialization must lead to chaos. The reason given by Mr. Maurice Dobb is therefore inadmissible. What has to be explained is why one integrating force (the entrepreneur) should be substituted for another integrating force (the price mechanism).
The most interesting reasons (and probably the most widely accepted) which have been given to explain this fact are those to be found in Professor Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. His views will be examined in some details.
Professor Knight starts with a system in which there is no uncertainty: "Acting as individuals under absolute freedom but without collusion men are supposed to have organized economic life with the primary and secondary division of labor, the use of capital, etc., developed to the point familiar in present-day America. The principal fact which calls for the exercise of
the imagination is the internal organization of the productive groups or establishments. With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation, here would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of productive activity. Even marketing transactions in any realistic sense would not be found. The flow of raw materials and productive services to the consumer would be entirely automatic.”
Professor Knight says that we can imagine this adjustment as being "the result of long process of experimentation worked out by trial-and-error methods alone," while it is not necessary "to imagine every worker doing exactly the right thing at the right time in a sort of ' pre-established harmony' with the work of others. There might be managers, superintendents, etc., for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of individuals," though these managers would be performing a purely routine function, "without responsibility of any sort. "
Professor Knight then continues:
"With the introduction of uncertainty-the fact of ignorance and the necessity of acting upon opinion rather than knowledge-into this Eden-like situation, its character is entirely changed ... With uncertainty present doing things, the actual execution of activity, becomes in a real sense a secondary part of life; the primary problem or function is deciding what to do and how to do it."
This fact of uncertainty brines about the two most important characteristics of social organization.
"In the first place, goods are produced for a market, on the basis of entirely impersonal prediction of wants, not for the satisfaction of the wants of the producers themselves. The producer takes the responsibility of forecasting the consumers' wants. In the second place, the work of forecasting and at the same time a large part of the technological direction and control of production are still further concentrated upon a very narrow class of the producers, and we meet with a new economic functionary, the entrepreneur. When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it takes the ascendancy over that of execution the internal organization of the productive groups is no longer a matter of Indifference or a mechanical detail Centralization of this deciding and controlling function is imperative, a process of 'captainlism’ is inevitable.
The most fundamental change is:
" the system under which the confident and venturesome，assume the risk or insure the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income in return for an assignment of the actual results. . . . With human nature as we know it , it would be impracticable or very unusual for one man
to guarantee to another a definite result of the latter's actions without being given power to direct his work. And on the other hand the second party would not place himself under the direction of the first without such a guarantee. . . . The result of this manifold specialization of function is the enterprise and wage system of industry. Its existence in the world is the direct result of the fact of uncertainty."
These quotations give the essence of Professor Knight's theory. The fact of uncertainty means that people have to forecast future wants. Therefore, you get a special class springing up who direct the activities of others to whom they give guaranteed wages. It acts because good judgment is generally associated with confidence in one's judgment.
Professor Knight would appear to leave himself open to criticism on several grounds. First of all, as he himself points out, the fact that certain people have better judgment or better knowledge does not mean that they can only get an income from it by themselves actively taking part in production. They can sell advice or knowledge. Every business buys the services of a host of advisers. We can imagine a system where all advice or knowledge was bought as required. Again, it is possible to get a reward from better knowledge or judgment not by activity taking part in production but by making contracts with people who are producing. A merchant buying for future delivery represents an example of this. But this merely illustrates the Point that it is quite possible to give a guaranteed reward providing that certain acts are performed without directing the performance of those acts. Professor Knight says that "with human nature as we know it, it would be impracticable or very unusual for one man to guarantee to another a definite result of the latter's actions without being given power to direct his work." This is surely incorrect. A large proportion of jobs are done to contract，that is, the contractor is guaranteed a certain sum providing he performs certain acts. But this does not involve any direction. It does mean, however, that the system of relative price has been changed and that there will be a new arrangement of the factors of production. The fact that Professor Knight mentions that the "second party would not place himself under the direction of the first without such a guarantee" is irrelevant to the problem we are considering. Finally, it seems important to notice that even in the case of an economic system where there is no uncertainty Professor Knight considers that there would be co-ordinators, though they would perform only a routine function. He immediately adds that they would be "without responsibility of any sort," which raise the question by whom are they paid and why? It seems that nowhere does Professor Knight give a reason why the price mechanism should be superseded.
Ⅳ
It would seem Important to examine one further point and that is to consider the relevance of this discussion to the general question of the "cost-curve of the firm."
It has sometimes been assumed that a firm is limited in size under perfect competition if it’s cost curve slopes upward， while under imperfect competition, it is limited in size because it will not pay to produce more than the output at which marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. But it is clear that a firm may produce more than one product and, therefore, there appears to be no prima facie reason why this upward slope of the cost curve in the case of perfect competition or the fact that marginal cost will not always be below marginal revenue in the case of imperfect completion should limit the size of the fir m. Mrs. Robinson makes the simplifying assumption that only one product is being produced. But it is clearly important to investigate how the number of products produced by a firm is determined，while no theory which assumes that only one product is in fact produced can have very great practical significance.
It might be replied that under perfect competition, since everything that is produced can be sold at the prevailing price, then there is no need for any other product to be produced. But this argument ignores the fact that there may be a point where it is less costly to organize the exchange transactions of a new product than to organize further exchange transactions of the old product. This point can be illustrated in the following way. Imagines, following von Thune， that there is a town, the consuming centre, and that industry are located around this central point in rings. These conditions are illustrated in the following diagram in which A, B and C represents different industry. Imagine an entrepreneur who starts controlling exchange transactions from x. Now as he extends his activities in the same produce (B), the cost of organizing increase until at some point it becomes equal to that of a dissimilar product which is nearer. As the firm expands， it will therefore from this point include more than one product (A and C).
This treatment of the problem is obviously incomplete, but it is necessary to show that merely proving that the cost curve turns upwards does not give a limitation to the size of the firm. So far we have only considered the case of perfect competition; the case of imperfect competition would appear to be obvious.
To determine the size of the firm, we have to consider the marketing cost( that is, the cost of using price mechanism)， and the costs of organizing of deferent entrepreneurs and then we can determine how many products will be produced by e:ch firm and how much of each it will produce. It would, therefore, appear that Mr. Shove in his article on "Imperfect Competition”
黄自艺术歌曲钢琴伴奏及艺术成就
【摘要】黄自先生是我国杰出的音乐家，他以艺术歌曲的创作最为代表。而黄自先生特别强调了钢琴伴奏对于艺术歌曲组成的重要性。本文是以黄自先生创作的具有爱国主义和人道主义的艺术歌曲《天伦歌》为研究对象，通过对作品分析，归纳钢琴伴奏的弹奏方法与特点，并总结黄自先生的艺术成就与贡献。 【关键词】艺术歌曲；和声；伴奏织体；弹奏技巧 一、黄自艺术歌曲《天伦歌》的分析 （一）《天伦歌》的人文及创作背景。黄自的艺术歌曲《天伦歌》是一首具有教育意义和人道主义精神的作品。同时，它也具有民族性的特点。这首作品是根据联华公司的影片《天伦》而创作的主题曲，也是我国近代音乐史上第一首为电影谱写的艺术歌曲。作品创作于我国政治动荡、经济不稳定的30年代，这个时期，这种文化思潮冲击着我国各个领域，连音乐艺术领域也未幸免――以《毛毛雨》为代表的黄色歌曲流传广泛，对人民大众，尤其是青少年的不良影响极其深刻，黄自为此担忧，创作了大量艺术修养和文化水平较高的艺术歌曲。《天伦歌》就是在这样的历史背景下创作的，作品以孤儿失去亲人的苦痛为起点，发展到人民的发愤图强，最后升华到博爱、奋起的民族志向，对青少年的爱国主义教育有着重要的影响。 （二）《天伦歌》曲式与和声。《天伦歌》是并列三部曲式，为a+b+c，最后扩充并达到全曲的高潮。作品中引子和coda所使用的音乐材料相同，前后呼应，合头合尾。这首艺术歌曲结构规整，乐句进行的较为清晰，所使用的节拍韵律符合歌词的特点，如三连音紧密连接，为突出歌词中号召的力量等。 和声上，充分体现了中西方作曲技法融合的创作特性。使用了很多七和弦。其中，一部分是西方的和声，一部分是将我国传统的五声调式中的五个音纵向的结合，构成五声性和弦。与前两首作品相比，《天伦歌》的民族性因素增强，这也与它本身的歌词内容和要弘扬的爱国主义精神相对应。 （三）《天伦歌》的伴奏织体分析。《天伦歌》的前奏使用了a段进唱的旋律发展而来的，具有五声调性特点，增添了民族性的色彩。在作品的第10小节转调入近关系调，调性的转换使歌曲增添抒情的情绪。这时的伴奏加强和弦力度，采用切分节奏，节拍重音突出，与a段形成强弱的明显对比，突出悲壮情绪。 c段的伴奏采用进行曲的风格，右手以和弦为主，表现铿锵有力的进行。右手为上行进行，把全曲推向最高潮。左手仍以柱式和弦为主，保持节奏稳定。在作品的扩展乐段，左手的节拍低音上行与右手的八度和弦与音程对应，推动音乐朝向宏伟、壮丽的方向进行。coda 处，与引子材料相同，首尾呼应。 二、《天伦歌》实践研究 《天伦歌》是具有很强民族性因素的作品。所谓民族性，体现在所使用的五声性和声、传统歌词韵律以及歌曲段落发展等方面上。 作品的整个发展过程可以用伤感――悲壮――兴奋――宏达四个过程来表述。在钢琴伴奏弹奏的时候，要以演唱者的歌唱状态为中心，选择合适的伴奏音量、音色和音质来配合，做到对演唱者的演唱同步，并起到连接、补充、修饰等辅助作用。 作品分为三段，即a+b+c+扩充段落。第一段以五声音阶的进行为主，表现儿童失去父母的悲伤和痛苦，前奏进入时要弹奏的使用稍凄楚的音色，左手低音重复进行，在弹奏完第一个低音后，要迅速的找到下一个跨音区的音符；右手弹奏的要有棱角，在前奏结束的时候第四小节的t方向的延音处，要给演唱者留有准备。演唱者进入后，左手整体的踏板使用的要连贯。随着作品发展，伴奏与旋律声部出现轮唱的形式，要弹奏的流动性强，稍突出一些。后以mf力度出现的具有转调性质的琶音奏法，要弹奏的如流水般连贯。在重复段落，即“小
我国艺术歌曲钢琴伴奏-精
我国艺术歌曲钢琴伴奏-精 2020-12-12 【关键字】传统、作风、整体、现代、快速、统一、发展、建立、了解、研究、特点、突出、关键、内涵、情绪、力量、地位、需要、氛围、重点、需求、特色、作用、结构、关系、增强、塑造、借鉴、把握、形成、丰富、满足、帮助、发挥、提高、内心 【摘要】艺术歌曲中，伴奏、旋律、诗歌三者是不可分割的重 要因素，它们三个共同构成一个统一体，伴奏声部与声乐演唱处于 同样的重要地位。形成了人声与器乐的巧妙的结合，即钢琴和歌唱 的二重奏。钢琴部分的音乐使歌曲紧密的联系起来，组成形象变化 丰富而且不中断的套曲，把音乐表达的淋漓尽致。 【关键词】艺术歌曲；钢琴伴奏；中国艺术歌曲 艺术歌曲中，钢琴伴奏不是简单、辅助的衬托，而是根据音乐 作品的内容为表现音乐形象的需要来进行创作的重要部分。准确了 解钢琴伴奏与艺术歌曲之间的关系,深层次地了解其钢琴伴奏的风 格特点,能帮助我们更为准确地把握钢琴伴奏在艺术歌曲中的作用 和地位，从而在演奏实践中为歌曲的演唱起到更好的烘托作用。 一、中国艺术歌曲与钢琴伴奏 “中西结合”是中国艺术歌曲中钢琴伴奏的主要特征之一，作 曲家们将西洋作曲技法同中国的传统文化相结合，从开始的借鉴古 典乐派和浪漫主义时期的创作风格，到尝试接近民族乐派及印象主 义乐派的风格，在融入中国风格的钢琴伴奏写作，都是对中国艺术 歌曲中钢琴写作技法的进一步尝试和提高。也为后来的艺术歌曲写 作提供了更多宝贵的经验，在长期发展中，我国艺术歌曲的钢琴伴 奏也逐渐呈现出多姿多彩的音乐风格和特色。中国艺术歌曲的钢琴
写作中，不可忽略的是钢琴伴奏织体的作用，因此作曲家们通常都以丰富的伴奏织体来烘托歌曲的意境，铺垫音乐背景，增强音乐感染力。和声织体，复调织体都在许多作品中使用，较为常见的是综合织体。这些不同的伴奏织体的歌曲，极大限度的发挥了钢琴的艺术表现力，起到了渲染歌曲氛围，揭示内心情感，塑造歌曲背景的重要作用。钢琴伴奏成为整体乐思不可缺少的部分。优秀的钢琴伴奏织体，对发掘歌曲内涵，表现音乐形象，构架诗词与音乐之间的桥梁等方面具有很大的意义。在不断发展和探索中，也将许多伴奏织体使用得非常娴熟精确。 二、青主艺术歌曲《我住长江头》中钢琴伴奏的特点 《我住长江头》原词模仿民歌风格，抒写一个女子怀念其爱人的深情。青主以清新悠远的音乐体现了原词的意境，而又别有寄寓。歌调悠长，但有别于民间的山歌小曲；句尾经常出现下行或向上的拖腔，听起来更接近于吟哦古诗的意味，却又比吟诗更具激情。钢琴伴奏以江水般流动的音型贯穿全曲，衬托着气息宽广的歌唱，象征着绵绵不断的情思。由于运用了自然调式的旋律与和声，显得自由舒畅，富于浪漫气息，并具有民族风味。最有新意的是，歌曲突破了“卜算子”词牌双调上、下两阕一般应取平行反复结构的惯例，而把下阕单独反复了三次，并且一次比一次激动，最后在全曲的高音区以ff结束。这样的处理突出了思念之情的真切和执著，并具有单纯的情歌所没有的昂奋力量。这是因为作者当年是大革命的参加者，正被反动派通缉，才不得不以破格的音乐处理，假借古代的
奈达翻译理论初探
第27卷第3期唐山师范学院学报2005年5月Vol. 27 No.3 Journal of Tangshan Teachers College May 2005 奈达翻译理论初探 尹训凤1，王丽君2 （1.泰山学院外语系，山东泰安 271000；2.唐山师范学院教务处，河北唐山 063000） 摘要：奈达的翻译理论对于翻译实践有很强的指导作用：从语法分析角度来讲，相同的语法结构可能具有完全不同的含义；词与词之间的关系可以通过逆转换将表层形式转化为相应的核心句结构；翻译含义是翻译成败的关键所在。 关键词：奈达；分析；转换；重组；核心句 中图分类号：H315.9 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1009-9115（2005）03-0034-03 尤金?奈达是美国当代著名翻译理论家，也是西方语言学派翻译理论的主要代表，被誉为西方“现代翻译理论之父”。他与塔伯合著的《翻译理论与实践》对翻译界影响颇深。此书说明了中国与西方译界人士思维方式的巨大差别：前者是静的，崇尚“信、达、雅”，讲究“神似”，追求“化境”；后者是动的，将语言学、符号学、交际理论运用到翻译研究当中，提倡“动态对等”，注重读者反应。中国译论多概括，可操作性不强；西方译论较具体，往往从点出发。他在该书中提到了动态对等，详细地描述了翻译过程的三个阶段：分析、转换和重组，对于翻译实践的作用是不言而喻的。笔者拟结合具体实例，从以下角度来分析其理论独到之处。 一 一般来说，结构相同的词组、句子，其语法意义是相同或相近的。然而奈达提出，同样的语法结构在许多情况下可以有不同的含义。“名词+of+名词”这一语法结构可以对此作最好的阐释。如下例： （1）the plays of Shakespeare/ the city of New York/ the members of the team/ the man of ability/ the lover of music/ the order of obedience/ the arrival of the delegation 在以上各个词组中，假设字母A和B分别代表一个名词或代词，它们之间存在着不同的关系。在the plays of Shakespeare 中，Shakespeare是施事，plays是受事，用公式表示就是“B writes A”；在the city of New York中，city和New York是同位关系，用公式表示就是“A is B”；the members of the team中，members和team是所属关系，即“A is in the B”；在the man of ability中，“B is A’s characteristic”；在the lover of music中，lover表示的是活动，即动作，music是它的受事，因此可以理解为（he/she）loves the music, 用公式表示就是“X does A to B”（X施A于B）或“B is the goal of A”（B为A的受事）；在the order of obedience中，obedience表示的是活动，order是它的受事，因此用公式表示就是“X does B to A”（X施B于A）或“A is the goal of B”（A为B的受事）；在the arrival of the delegation中，arrival表示动作，而delegation是动作的发出者，所以是“B does A”。 因此它们的结构关系如下所示： the plays of Shakespeare——Shakespeare wrote the plays. the city of New York——The city is New York. the members of the team——The members are in the team. the man of ability——The man is able. the lover of music——(He/She) loves the music. the order of obedience——(People) obey the order. the arrival of the delegation——The delegation arrives. ────────── 收稿日期：2004-06-10 作者简介：尹训凤（1976-），女，山东泰安人，泰山学院外语系教师，现为天津外国语学院研究生部2003级研究生，研究方向为翻译理论与实践。 - 34 -
奈达翻译理论简介
奈达翻译理论简介 （一）奈达其人尤金?奈达（EugeneA.Nida）1914年出生于美国俄克勒荷马州，当代著名语言学家、翻译家和翻译理论家。也是西方语言学派翻译理论的主要代表，被誉为西方“现代翻译理论之父”。尤金是当代翻译理论的主要奠基人，其理论核心是功能对等。 尤金先后访问过90个国家和地区，并著书立说，单独或合作出版了40多部书，比较著名的有《翻译科学探索》、《语言与文化———翻译中的语境》等，他还发表论文250余篇，是世界译坛的一位长青学者。他还参与过《圣经》的翻译工作。他与塔伯合著的《翻译理论与实践》对翻译界影响颇深。此书说明了中国与西方译界人士思维方式的巨大差别：前者是静的，崇尚“信、达、雅”，讲究“神似”，追求“化境”；后者是动的，将语言学、符号学、交际理论运用到翻译研究当中，提倡“动态对等”，注重读者反应。中国译论多概括，可操作性不强；西方译论较具体，往往从点出发。他在该书中提到了动态对等，详细地描述了翻译过程的三个阶段：分析、转换和重组，对于翻译实践的作用是不言而喻的。 （二）奈达对翻译的定义 按照奈达的定义：“所谓翻译，是指从语义到文体（风格）在译语中用最切近而又最自然的对等语再现 源语的信息。”其中，“对等”是核心，“最切近”和“最自然”都是为寻找对等语服务的。奈达从社会语言学和语言交际功能的观点出发，认为必须以读者的反应作为衡量译作是否正确的重要标准。翻译要想达到预期的交际目的，必须使译文从信息内容、说话方式、文章风格、语言文化到社会因素等方面尽可能多地反映出原文的面貌。他试图运用乔姆斯基的语言学理论建立起一套新的研究方法。他根据转换生成语法，特别是其中有关核心句的原理，提出在语言的深层结构里进行传译的设想。 奈达提出了词的4种语义单位的概念，即词具有表述事物、事件、抽象概念和关系等功能。这4种语义单位是“核心”，语言的表层结构就是以“核心”为基础构建的，如果能将语法结构归纳到核心层次，翻译过程就可最大限度地避免对源语的曲解。按照4种语义单位的关系，奈达将英语句子归结为7个核心句：（1）Johnranquickly.（2）JohnhitBill.（3）JohngaveBillaball.（4）Johnisinthehouse.（5）Johnissick.（6）Johnisaboy.（7）Johnismyfather. （三）奈达翻译理论的经历阶段 奈达翻译理论的发展经历过三个阶段，分别是描写语言阶段、交际理论阶段和和社会符号学阶段。 第一个阶段始于1943年发表《英语句法概要》，止于1959年发表《从圣经翻译看翻译原则》。这一阶段是奈达翻译思想及学术活动的初期。 第二阶段始于1959年发表的《从圣经翻译看翻译原则》，止于1969年出版的《翻译理论与实践》。主要著作有《翻译科学探索》、《信息与使命》。在这10年中，奈达确立了自己在整个西方翻译理论界的权威地位。1964年出版的《翻译科学探索》标志着其翻译思想发展过程中一个最重要的里程碑。第三阶段始于70年代，奈达通过不断修正和发展自己翻译理论创建了新的理论模式———社会符号学模式。奈达在继承原有理论有用成分的基础上，将语言看成一种符号现象，并结合所在社会环境进行解释。在《从一种语言到另一种语言》一书中，奈达强调了形式的重要性，认为形式也具有意义，指出语言的修辞特征在语言交际及翻译中的重要作用，并且用“功能对等”取代了“动态对等”的提法，是含义更加明确。 三、对奈达翻译理论的评价 （一）贡献 奈达是一位硕果累累的翻译理论家。可以说，在两千年的西方翻译思想发展史上，奈达的研究成果之丰是名列前茅的。他的研究范围从翻译史、翻译原则、翻译过程和翻译方法到翻译教学和翻译的组织工作，从口译到笔译，从人工翻译到机器翻译，从语义学到人类文化学，几乎无所不包，从而丰富并拓展了西方的翻译研究领地。 奈达的理论贡献，主要在于他帮助创造了一种用新姿态对待不同语言和文化的气氛，以增进人类相互之间的语言交流和了解。他坚持认为：任何能用一种语言表达的东西都能够用另一种语言来表达；在语言之间、文化之间能通过寻找翻译对等语，以适当方式重组原文形式和语义结构来进行交际。因此也说明，某
奈达翻译理论动态功能对等的新认识
To Equivalence and Beyond: Reflections on the Significance of Eugene A. Nida for Bible Translating1 Kenneth A. Cherney, Jr. It’s been said, and it may be true, that there are two kinds of people—those who divide people into two kinds and those who don’t. Similarly, there are two approaches to Bible translation—approaches that divide translations into two kinds and those that refuse. The parade example of the former is Jerome’s claim that a translator’s options are finally only two: “word-for-word” or “sense-for-sense.”2 Regardless of whether he intended to, Jerome set the entire conversation about Bible translating on a course from which it would not deviate for more than fifteen hundred years; and some observers in the field of translation studies have come to view Jerome’s “either/or” as an unhelpful rut from which the field has begun to extricate itself only recently and with difficulty. Another familiar dichotomy is the distinction between “formal correspondence” translating on one hand and “dynamic equivalence” (more properly “functional equivalence,” on which see below) on the other. The distinction arose via the work of the most influential figure in the modern history of Bible translating: Eugene Albert Nida (1914-2011). It is impossible to imagine the current state of the field of translation studies, and especially Bible translating, without Nida. Not only is he the unquestioned pioneer of modern, so-called “meaning-based” translating;3 he may be more responsible than any other individual for putting Bibles in the hands of people around the world that they can read and understand. 1 This article includes material from the author’s doctoral thesis (still in progress), “Allusion as Translation Problem: Portuguese Versions of Second Isaiah as Test Case” (Stellenbosch University, Drs. Christo Van der Merwe and Hendrik Bosman, promoters). 2 Jerome, “Letter to Pammachius,” in Lawrence Venuti, ed., The Translation Studies Reader, 2nd ed. (NY and London: Routledge, 2004), p. 23. 3 Nigel Statham, "Nida and 'Functional Equivalence': The Evolution of a Concept, Some Problems, and Some Possible Ways Forward," Bible Translator 56, no. 1 (2005), p. 39.
“功能对等”翻译理论奈达翻译理论体系的核心
［摘要］传统的只围绕直译与意译之争，而奈达从《圣经》翻译提出功能对等即读者同等反应。“功能对等”翻译理论是奈达翻译理论体系的核心,是从新的视角提出的新的翻译方法，它既有深厚的理论基础,也有丰富的实践基础，对翻译理论的进一步完善是一大贡献。 ［关键词］功能对等；奈达翻译；英语论文范文 尤金·A·奈达博士是西方语言学翻译理论学派的代表人物之一。在他的学术生涯中，从事过语言学、语义学、人类学、通讯工程学等方面的研究，还从事过《圣经》的翻译工作，精通多国文字，调查过100多种语言。经过五十多年的翻译实践与理论研究，取得了丰硕的成果。至今他已发表了40多部专着、250余篇论文。“自八十年代初奈达的理论介绍入中国以来，到现在已经成为当代西方理论中被介绍的最早、最多、影响最大的理论。他把信息论与符号学引进了翻译理论，提出了‘动态对等’的翻译标准；把现代语言学的最新研究成果应用到翻译理论中来；在翻译史上第一个把社会效益（读者反应）原则纳入翻译标准之中。尤其是他的动态对等理论，一举打破中国传统译论中静态分析翻译标准的局面，提出了开放式的翻译理论原则，为我们建立新的理论模式找到了正确的方向。奈达在中国译界占据非常重要的地位。”“奈达的理论贡献，主要在于他帮助创造了一种新姿态对待不同语言和文化的气氛，以增进人类相互之间的语言交流和了解。”[1] 翻译作为一项独立的学科，首先应回答的问题就是：什么是翻译？传统翻译理论侧重语言的表现形式，人们往往醉心于处理语言的特殊现象，如诗的格律、诗韵、咬文嚼字、句子排比和特殊语法结构等等。现代翻译理论侧重读者对译文的反应以及两种反应（原文与原作读者、译文与译作读者）之间的对比。奈达指出：“所谓翻译，就是指从语义到文体在译语中用最贴切而又最自然的对等语再现原语的信息”，奈达在《翻译理论于实践》一书中解释道，所谓最切近的自然对等，是指意义和语体而言。但在《从一种语言到另一种语言》中，奈达又把对等解释为是指功能而言。语言的“功能”是指语言在使用中所能发挥的言语作用；不同语言的表达形式必然不同，不是语音语法不同就是表达习惯不同，然而他们却可以具有彼此相同或相似的功能。奈达所强调的是“对等”“、信息”“、意义”和“风格”，奈达从语义学和信息论出发，强调翻译的交际功能，正如他自己所说“：翻译就是交际”，目的是要寻求原语和接受语的“对等”。他所说的“信息”包括“意义”和“风格”，着重于交际层面。他实质上要打破的是传统的翻译标准。他把翻译看成是“语际交际”，也就是在用交际学的观点来看问题。交际至少应当是三方的事情：信息源点———信息内容———信息受者，也就是说话者———语言———听话者。奈达注重译文的接受者，即读者，而且都对读者进行了分类。奈达根据读者的阅读能力和兴趣把读者分为四类：儿童读者、初等文化水平读者、普通成人读者和专家。他曾说过，一些优秀的译者，常常设想有一位典型的译文读者代表就坐在写字台的对面听他们口述译文，或者正在阅读闪现在电脑显示屏上的译文。这样，就好像有人正在听着或读着译文，翻译也就不仅仅是寻求词汇和句法的对应过程。运用这种方法，译者就可能更自觉地意识到“翻译就是翻译意思”的道理。 可译性与不可译性是翻译界长期争论的一个问题。奈达对不同的之间的交流提出了新的观点。他认为每种语言都有自己的特点，一种语言所表达的任何东西都可以用另一种语言来表达。尽管不同民族之间难以达到“绝对的”交流，但是可以进行“有效的”交流，因为人类的思维过程、生产经历、社会反应等有许多共性。他这种思想主要基于他对上帝的信仰和对《圣经》的翻译。在他看来，上帝的福音即是真理，可以译成不同的语言，也可以为不同国家的人所理解。因此，他提出“最贴近、最自然的对等”。 奈达把翻译分为两种类型：形式对等翻译和动态功能对等。翻译形式对等是以原语为中心，尽量再现原文形式和内容。功能对等注重读者反映，以最贴近、最自然的对等语再现原文信息，使译文读者能够达到和原文读者一样的理解和欣赏原文的程度。奈达的形式对等要求严格地再现原语的形式，其实也就是“逐字翻译”或“死译”。奈达本人也不主张形式对等的翻译，他认为严格遵守形式无疑会破坏内容。 奈达的“功能对等”理论的提出是对译学研究的一个重大贡献。首先，他提出了一个新的翻译评价标准。他指出：翻译准确与否取决于普通读者正确理解原文的程度，也就是把译文读者反应与原文读者反应进行对照，看两者是否达到最大限度的对等。其次，他提出的“最贴切、最自然的对等”标准也不同于传统的“忠实”
The-theory-and-practice-of-translation-奈达的翻译理论与实践
The theory and practice of translation Eugene A. Nida and Charles R. Taber 1974 Contents 1.A new concept of translation 2.The nature of translating 3.Grammatical analysis 4.Referential meaning 5.Connotative meaning 6.Transfer 7.Restructuring 8.\ 9.Testing the translation Chapter One The old focus and the new focus The older focus in translating was the form of the message, and the translator too particular delight in being able to reproduce stylistic specialties, ., rhythms, rhymes, plays on words, chiasmus, parallelism, and usual grammatical structures. The new focus, however, has shifted from teh form of the message to the response of the receptor. Therefore, what one must determine is the response of the receptor to te translated message, this response must be compared with the way in which the original receptors presumably reacted to the message when it was given in its original setting. Chapter Two Translating consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message, first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of style. But this relatively simple statement requires careful evaluation of several seemingly contradictory elements. Reproducing the message Translating must aim primarily at “reproducing the message.” To do anything else is essentially false to one’s task as a translator. But to reproduce the message one must make a good many grammatical and lexical adjustments. Equivalence rather than identity 。 The translator must strive for the equivalence rather than identity. In a sense, this is just another way of emphasizing the reproduction of the message rather than the conversation of the form of the utterance, but it reinforces the need for radical alteration of a phrase, which may be quiet meaningless.
奈达和纽马克翻译理论对比初探
[摘要] 尤金·奈达和彼得·纽马克的翻译理论在我国产生很大的影响。他们在对翻译的认识及处理内容与形式关系方面有共识亦有差异。他们孜孜不倦发展自身理论的精神值得中国翻译理论界学习。 [关键词] 翻译; 动态对等; 语义翻译和交际翻译; 关联翻译法 Abstract :Both Nida and Newmark are outstanding western theorist in the field of translation. They have many differences as well as similarities in terms of the nature of translation and the relationship between the form and content. Their constant effort to develop their theories deserve our respect. Key words :translation ; dynamic equivalence ; semantic translation ; communicative translation ; a correlative approach to translation 尤金·奈达( Eugene A1Nida) 和彼得·纽马克是西方译界颇具影响的两位翻译理论家, 他们在翻译理论方面有诸多共通之处, 同时又各具特色。 一、对翻译的认识 对翻译性质的认识, 理论界的讨论由来已久。奈达和纽马克都对翻译是科学还是艺术的问题的认识经历了一个变化的过程。 奈达对翻译的认识经历了一个从倾向于把翻译看作科学到把翻译看作艺术的转化过程。在奈达翻译理论发展的第二个阶段即交际理论阶段, 他认为, 翻译是科学, 是对翻译过程的科学的描写。同时他也承认, 对翻译的描写可在三个功能层次上进行: 科学、技巧和艺术。在奈达逐渐向第三个阶段, 即社会符号学和社会语言学阶段过渡的过程中, 他越来越倾向于把翻译看作是艺术。他认为翻译归根到底是艺术, 翻译家是天生的。同时, 他把原来提出的“翻译是科学”改为“翻译研究是科学”。到了上世纪90 年代, 奈达又提出, 翻译基本上是一种技艺。他认为: 翻译既是艺术, 也是科学, 也是技艺。 纽马克对翻译的认识也经历了一定的变化。最初, 他认为, 翻译既是科学又是艺术, 也是技巧。后来他又认为翻译部分是科学, 部分是技巧, 部分是艺术, 部分是个人品位。他对翻译性质的阐释是基于对语言的二元划分。他把语言分为标准语言和非标准语言。说翻译是科学, 因为标准语言通常只有一种正确译法, 有规律可循, 体现了翻译是科学的一面。如科技术语。非标准语言往往有许多正确译法, 怎么挑选合适的译法要靠译者自身的眼光和能力, 体现了翻译是艺术和品位的性质。但译文也必须得到科学的检验, 以避免明显的内容和用词错误, 同时要行文自然, 符合语言环境要求。纽马克虽然认为翻译是科学, 但他不承认翻译作为一门科学的存在。因为他认为目前的翻译理论缺乏统一全面的体系, 根本不存在翻译的科学, 现在没有, 将来也不会有。 二、理论核心 奈达和纽马克都是在各自翻译实践的基础上, 为了解决自己实践中的实际问题, 提出了相应的翻译理论。实践中要解决的问题不同, 翻译理论也就各成一派。但毕竟每种实践都要有一定的规律存在, 因此两位的理论又有着不可忽视的相似。 奈达提出了著名的“动态对等”。他对翻译所下的定义: 所谓翻译, 是在译语中用最切近而又最自然的对等语再现源语的信息, 首先是意义, 其次是文体。这一定义明确指出翻译的本质和任务是用译语再现源语信息, 翻译的方法用最切近而又最自然的对等语。同时这一定义也提出了翻译的四个标准: 1 (1) 传达信息; 2 (2) 传达原作的精神风貌;
奈达翻译理论
Eugene Nida的翻译理论（转） 摘要：本文介绍了奈达的翻译思想，对其功能对等理论进行了分析，对奈达理论在翻译界的重要地位和重大影响进行了简单的评述。然后从五个方面探讨了当今翻译界对奈达思想的争论，介绍了争论中提出的新概念，并进行了一定的分析。最后，文章探讨了奈达思想形成的原因和在翻译实践中可以得到的启示。关键词：奈达功能对等争论启示一、奈达的翻译思想尤金·奈达（EugeneA.Nida）是公认的现代翻译理论奠基人之一。他供职于美国圣经协会，从事圣经翻译和翻译理论研究，其理论在中国甚至在全世界都有着重要的地位。奈达把翻译看作是一种艺术，力图把语言学应用于翻译研究。他认为，对翻译的研究应该看作是比较语言学的一个重要的分支；这种研究应以语义为核心包括翻译涉及的各个方面，即我们需要在动态对等的层次上进行这种比较。由于奈达把翻译和语言学密切联系，他把翻译的过程分成了四个阶段：分析（analysis），转换（transfer），重组（restructuring）和检验（test）。则翻译的具体过程就经过了下图的步骤。在这一过程中，奈达实际上是透过对原文的表层结构的分析，理解深层结构并将其转换重组到译文中。因此，在翻译中所要达到的效果是要让译文读者得到一个自然的译本。他曾说：“最好的译文读起来应不像翻译。”所以，他的翻译中另一个非常突出的特点就是“读者反应论”。他认为，翻译正确与否必须以译文的服务对象为衡量标准，并取决于一般读者能在何种程度上正确地理解译文。由此，他提出了他的“动态对等理论”。奈达在《翻译科学探素》(1964)一书中指出，“在动态对等翻译中，译者所关注的并不是源语信息和译语信息的对应关系，而是一种动态关系；即译语接受者和译语信息之间的关系应该与源语接受者和原文信息之间的关系基本相同”。他认为，所谓翻译，是指从语义到文体在译语中的最贴近而又最自然的对等语再现源语的信息（郭建中，2000）。所谓自然，是指使用译语中的表达方式，也就是说在翻译中使用归化，而不是异化。然而由于动态对等引起不少误解，认为翻译只要内容不要形式，在奈达的《从一种语言到另一种语言：论圣经翻译中的功能对等》一书中，他把“动态对等”的名称改为“功能对等”，并指出信息不仅包括思想内容，也包括语言形式。功能对等的翻译，要求“不但是信息内容的对等，而且，尽可能地要求形式对等”。二、奈达理论的评析毫无疑问，奈达是当代最著名也是最重要的翻译家之一，他的翻译理论，特别是他的功能对等理论在全世界的翻译界产生了重大的影响。约翰·比克曼（JohnBeekman）和约翰·卡洛（JohnCallow）的《翻译圣经》中说：“传译了原文意义和原文动态的翻译，称之为忠实的翻译。”而所谓“传译原文的动态”，就是指译文应使用目标语自然的语言结构，译文读者理解信息毫不费力，译文和原文一样自然、易懂。同时，他们也认为译者所要传达的是源语表达的信息，而不是源语的表达形式。在米尔德里德·L·拉森（https://www.sodocs.net/doc/8c7176293.html,rson）的《意义翻译法：语际对等指南》中，当谈到形式与意义时，拉森说得更为直截了当：“翻译基本上是改变形式（achangeofform）……是用接受语（目标语）的形式代替源语的形式。”她还表示，语言的深层结构与表层结构是不同的，我们所要翻译的是深层结构，即意义，而不是表层结构，即语言表达形式。然而正如郭建中(2000)所说：“内容与形式，意译与直译，以译文读者和译文为中心与以原作者和原文为中心……是翻译理论和翻译实践中一个永恒的辩论主题。”虽然奈达在全世界有着重要的影响和极高的地位，但他的理论却也一直引起各家争议。关于奈达理论的争议，主要是围绕以下五点展开的：（一）对等理论的适用范围这是长期以来对奈达翻译理论的争议得最多最激烈的问题。许多的翻译家都认为其理论是不适合文学翻译的。以诗歌翻译为例，林语堂曾经说过：“诗乃最不可译的东西。无论古今中外，最好的诗（而尤其是抒情诗）都是不可译的。”而著名诗人海岸（2005）在他的《诗人译诗，译诗为诗》中也指出：不同文化背景之间的符号系统只能在所指层面达到一定的共享，建立在绝对理解上的诗歌翻译只能是一种难以企及的梦想。特别是英语诗中的音韵节律及一些特殊的修辞手法等均不能完全传译，正如辜正坤在《中西诗比较鉴赏与翻译理论》一书中所言，